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This study examines to what extent the Obama Administration legitimizes its use of 
drones by drawing on the conceptual framework of the just war tradition. In doing so, 
the study carries out a discourse analysis of the Obama Administration’s speeches on 
drone use and an internal legal memo, demonstrating how notions of the just war 
tradition are linked to the justification of the U.S. drone program. The discourse 
analysis is structured around the principles of the just war tradition in categorical 
terms. Thus, the analysis includes sections concerned with how the principles of just 
cause, right intention, proportionality etc. are apparent within key texts concerning 
U.S. drone use. In conducting such an examination, this study applies the discourse 
analytical framework of Norman Fairclough. While the principles of the just war 
tradition should be understood as conceptual categories for the analysis, Fairclough’s 
terminology serve as analytical tools in assessing to what extent the arguments of the 
Obama Administration are linked to these principles. 
 
It is argued that the Obama Administration’s framing of the U.S. drone program 
incorporates!principles of both jus ad bellum and jus in bello to a high extent in order 
to legitimize the use of drones. In this respect, the principles of the just war tradition 
are essential components in constructing a threat, in justifying a response!to this threat 
and the specific manner in which a response is formulated, i.e. how drones are being 
framed as the response to this threat. The study finds support for the thesis that the 
Obama Administration justifies its use of drones through an ideational framework of 
warfare rooted in the just war tradition. Additionally, it is argued that the Obama 
administration does not only reproduce the notions of the just war tradition; they 
recontextualize the tradition by applying the conventional framework of just warfare 
to a proclaimed ‘new’ and ‘unconventional’ conflict setting, thus ascribing novel 
meanings to the tradition. 
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In a military technological perspective, armed conflict has always been characterized by 
the effort to achieve greater distance to the enemy (Henriksen & Ringmose, 2013). 
Fuelled by an ambition to achieve a competitive advantage against opposing combatants, 
the development of diverse weapon technologies such as the bow and arrow, rifles, 
catapults, roadside bombs, cruise missiles and so on can be seen as incremental steps 
towards attaining greater asymmetry in armed conflicts and securing an unequal fight 
(ibid.). From this perspective, the development of Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles1 
(UCAV’s) as an instrumentality of war and their actual deployment in countries such as 
Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen and Pakistan as carried out by the U.S. can be seen as another 
significant step in military technological history (Henriksen & Ringmose, 2013; Singer, 
2009; Kahn, 2013). However, the effort towards achieving greater asymmetry is not 
only confined to the technological developments in themselves; the revolution in 
military affairs “ […] has normalized into steady, incremental advances in accuracy, 
information, and artificial intelligence” (Kahn, 2013), and some scholars argue that the 
emergence and use of drones as an instrument of armed conflicts has significantly 
altered both the military strategic and ethical dimensions of war (Henriksen & 
Ringmose, 2013). 
 
While there seems to be a general consensus that drones are here to stay (Singer, 2009; 
Anderson, 2011; Brunstetter & Braun 2011; Henriksen & Ringmose, 2013), the 
implications of drones are widely debated amongst IR scholars and policymakers alike.  
 
One of the prevailing debates about drone use concerns their military strategic 
implications. Some scholars argue that the U.S. benefits from its use of drones in the 
War on Terror and that drones entail a great advantage in killing Al Qaeda members 
around the world (Byman, 2013; Anderson, 2011). Additionally, drones reduce the need 
for boots on the ground, preventing American casualties and reduce the risk of a terrorist 
safe haven in the borderlands of Afghanistan and Pakistan (Byman, 2013). Advocates !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"!B;/!566&/G+5%+'$!S:X[M2?!5&7/(!(&'$/2!'&!(&'$/2!F+00!6/!)2/(!%;&')C;')%!%;+2!4&'E/*%,!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!P//!>/0+7+%5%+'$!2/*%+'$!1'&!7'&/!/056'&5%/(!&/10/*%+'$2,!!!
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for the use of armed drones as a means of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism 
stress their importance as “[…] a strategy of effectiveness, convenience, and necessity” 
(Anderson, 2011). However, the pro-drone discourses are not only limited to a military 
strategic model of reasoning. Anderson also emphasizes the ‘ethical advantages’ of 
drone warfare, “allowing for increased discrimination in time, manner, and targeting 
not available via any other comparable weapon platform,” hereby providing civilians 
“vastly greater protection than […] any other fighting tool.” (Anderson, 2011). Clearly 
related to this frame of argument are the statements of White House Counter Terrorism 
Adviser, John Brennan, maintaining that U.S. targeted strikes are both ‘ethical’, ‘just’ 
and ‘wise’ (Brennan, 2012).  
 
Critics on the other hand contest these views by questioning both the military strategic 
advantages of drones as well as the legitimacy of their use, arguing among other things 
that the use of drones impose an inherent threat on humanitarian rights as well as the 
sovereignty of the nation-state. Regarding the military strategic advantages of drones, 
critics have argued that the American use of targeted strikes in Pakistan is counter-
productive (Henriksen & Ringmose, 2013:25). Military analyst David Kilcullen 
contends that civilian losses related to U.S. drone strikes have caused a radicalization 
and anger towards the U.S. within the tribal territories of Pakistan, which overshadows 
the apparent benefits of these strikes (ibid.). In a U.S. congressional hearing he stated 
that while the U.S. has killed  
 
“[…] 14 Senior Al-Qaeda leaders using drone strikes; in the same period, we’ve killed 700 
Pakistani civilians in the same area. The drone strikes are highly unpopular. They are deeply 
aggravating to the population. And they’ve given rise to a feeling of anger that coalesces the 
population around the extremists and leads to spikes of extremism […]”  
(Kilcullen, 2009, in Henriksen & Ringmose, 2013) !
Civilian losses related to the use of armed drones are a core concern among critics of 
American drone use. However, flimsy evidence concerning the actual numbers of 
civilian casualties blurs the debate. Depending on the source, the number of civilian 
casualties in Northwest Pakistan varies greatly. The count of civilian casualties in 2009 
varies from 432 to 1193, and the same tendency of wavering conclusions can be !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!-!B;/!\)&/5)!'1!#$G/2%+C5%+G/!R')&$50+27?!-H"-!
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identified throughout the 14 years of data collection by The Bureau of Investigative 
Journalism and The Long War Journal, respectively (Henriksen & Ringmose, 2013.). 
From 2004-2013, The New America Foundation estimates a total number of casualties 
between 2071-3413, of which 1617-2776 were categorized as known militants (New 
America Foundation, 2013). However, these total estimates differ from source to source.  
As Henriksen & Ringmose points out, a significant part of this uncertainty is attributable 
to the differing conceptions of exactly how and when to characterize an individual as 
either a terrorist or a civilian (Henriksen & Ringmose, 2013). 
 
As mentioned above, the emergence of drones as an instrument of war does not only 
give rise to contestations about military strategic implications. The development of 
drones as a weapons system and the use of armed drone systems carried out by the U.S. 
have additionally prompted intense and often normative debates about the ethics and 
legality of the American drone program.  
 
When President Obama was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2009 for his 
extraordinary efforts to ”strengthen international diplomacy and cooperation between 
peoples" (Nobel Committee, 2009), he stressed the importance of the just war tradition 
as a restraining guideline for the use of force, underlining key aspects of the just war 
tradition by advocating that  
 
“[…] war is justified only when certain conditions were met;. if it is waged as a last resort 
or in self-defense; if the force used is proportional; and if, whenever possible, civilians are 
spared from violence.”              
 (Obama, 2009 in Brunstetter & Braun, 2011)  
 
While invoking these notions of just war in his speech, the Obama administration was 
concurrently carrying out military operations in Pakistan, Yemen, Afghanistan, Iraq and 
Somalia, targeting and killing perceived threats with unmanned combat drones 
(Brunstetter & Braun, 2011). It is the ethics and legality of these U.S. drone strikes or 
‘extrajudicial killings’ that has been questioned by critics. Amongst the most significant 
contributions to this part of the debate are the two recent UN reports by Christof 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!9!B;/!U'$C!]5&!R')&$50?!-H"-!
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Heynes4 and Ben Emmerson5. In a plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly, Ben 
Emmerson stated that 33 drone strikes known to have caused civilian casualties may 
have been a violation of international law. However, he stressed that “despite the 
proliferation of this technology, there remains a lack of consensus among international 
lawyers and between states on the core legal principles.” (Emmerson, 2013, cited in 
Pilkington & Devereaux, 2013). Emmerson’s statement captures the very essence of the 
legal controversies regarding extra-territorial use of drones; it exposes the difficulty of 
determining which legal framework is best suited to address these questions of 
legitimacy.  
In sum, the military strategic, ethical and judicial implications of drones are widely 
debated; nevertheless, few would contest that the United States has pioneered the field in 
respect of both developing and utilizing drones (Singer, 2009). Consequently, most 
academic studies concerned with the utilization of drones and potential military 
strategic, ethical and humanitarian implications have looked towards the politics and 
foreign policy discourses of the U.S. drone program. This will also be the case for this 
study. However, this study does not seek to partake in the normative debates of the 
legality of American drone strikes, nor is the aim to discuss the military strategic 
implications from a realist point of view.  
 
Instead this study applies a constructivist understanding of International Relations to the 
specific case of the U.S. drone program. As Kahn points out, the controversies of 
legitimacy arise out of a difficulty to categorize what legal framework should be applied 
(Kahn, 2013); are drones instruments of war or law enforcement? From a constructivist 
point of view, the central question is not whether U.S. drone use is right or wrong in 
legal sense, but rather a question of “how the imagination frames political violence” 
(Kahn, 2013:207) in a specific perspective, hereby creating specific knowledge and 
truth. Thus, the ideas and norms apparent in U.S. foreign policy frame American drone 
strikes within distinct regimes of truth that may exist in opposition to other 
understandings of reality. As elaborated in the next section, it is the ideas related to 
drone use that will be the core focus of this project.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!=!Christof Heyns is the UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions. V!Ben Emmerson is the UN special rapporteur on the special rapporteur on human rights and counter-
terrorism. !
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As mentioned in the field of interest, the most comprehensive academic debates about 
U.S. drone use have hitherto been focused on either military strategic implications or 
normative analyses concerning the legitimacy of the U.S. drone program. This study 
does not pay particular interest in the possible counter-productive nature of U.S drone 
strikes, and neither is it the intent to determine the legality of drone strikes. The 
argument that this study sets forth is that the discursively mediated ideas related to drone 
use matter to a great extent inasmuch as they construct distinct notions of truth and 
hereby justify specific foreign policy actions towards both the domestic and 
international system.6 Consequently, it is necessary to unsettle the prevailing perceptions 
of drone use apparent within the foreign policy discourses of the Obama administration. 
In doing so, this study argues that the Obama administration seeks to legitimize its use 
of drones by constructing a distinct ideational frame of understanding rooted in the just 
war tradition. With this fundamental thesis as a starting point, the key purpose of the 
study is hereby to address the following question: 
 
To what extent does the Obama administration legitimize its use of drones 
within an articulatory framework of warfare by drawing on key elements of 
the just war tradition? 
 
In other words, the ambition is to carry out a discourse analysis of American foreign 
policy discourses concerning drones, striving to uncover to what extent the Obama 
administration justifies U.S. drone use through an ideational concept of just war. The 
problem statement is approached through a discourse analysis of different speeches by 
key persons from the Obama administration and an additional analysis of The White 
Paper on drone use (for an elaboration see section 2.4).  
 
The discourse analysis is structured around the principles of the just war tradition in 
categorical terms. The analysis includes sections concerned with how the principles are 
apparent within the drone discourses of the Obama Administration. In conducting such 
an examination, this study applies the methodological framework of Norman Fairclough, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!8!P//!:'$%&+6)%+'$!2/*%+'$!",9!1'&!/056'&5%+'$!'$!%;/!&/0/G5$*/!'1!%;+2!2%)(K!+$!&/05%+'$!%'!'%;/&!4'2%2%&)*%)&50+2%!'&!*'$2%&)*%+G+2%!5$50K2/2!*'$*/&$+$C!(&'$/2,!
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presented in section 2.3. A more explicit elaboration on the methodological reflections 
concerning the study’s scientific contribution, delimitation, operationalization of theory 
and data selection follows in the forthcoming sections of the introduction.  
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The global emergence of drone technology and the use of armed drones by the United 
States have led to intense attention and awareness of drones in general. Drones are 
objects of great interest within the field of IR, and the augmented attention follows the 
increase in the use of armed drones during the presidency of Barack Obama.   
This study approaches the drone debate through a discourse analysis of key texts from 
the Obama Administration. By doing so this study sets itself apart from rationalist 
approaches, e.g. an investigation of whether drones are strategically beneficial for the 
U.S. military or not. Such an investigation is prone to discover what truth is; on the 
contrary, this study contributes with an examination of the production of truth and 
examines what consequences certain truths entail. This study does not focus on 
structures beyond discourses, but the construction of meaning through norms and 
discourses. In the present context, this implies that the study investigates how norms and 
ideas regarding drone use are constructed.  
It is important to emphasize that this study is not the first one in applying such an 
approach on the drone debate. Similar studies also attach importance to norms regarding 
drones, but with other substantial (and theoretical) focuses than this study. This includes 
Fisk & Ramos (2013) who investigate the degree to which an international norm toward 
preventive self-defense is cascading in the international system and how the cascade of 
the preventive self-defense norm correlates with the acquisition of drone technology 
(Fisk & Ramos, 2013). Kahn examines how drones are a symbol and a part of the 
dynamic destruction of a stable imaginative structure of political violence (Kahn, 
2013:199). By this it is emphasized how the emergence of drones challenge traditional 
norms of warfare, what he calls political violence. Kessler & Werner (2008) also focus 
on the blurring norms of war and law enforcement, but in a wider context of the War on 
Terror. They argue that extrajudicial killings become a form of risk management 
(Kessler & Werner, 2008:289).In contrary to the above-mentioned studies, this study 
! A!
will perform a discourse analysis of speeches and an internal legal document of the 
Obama Administration. The study will touch upon some of the same problems and 
discussions as other scholars, but in an unprecedented empirical framework. The 
contribution of the current study is an investigation of how drone use is framed through 
particular articulations, and how these ideas construct a distinct ideational system of 
truth in which U.S. drone use is both rightful and appropriate. Conclusively, the project 
demonstrates to what extent the Obama Administration utilizes the just war tradition in 
order to justify its use of drones.  
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The main focus of the project is the articulation of drone use, specifically the U.S. 
articulation of armed drones, Type III drones or Unmanned Combat Arial vehicles, even 
though these drones only constitute about 5 % of the total amount of US drones 
(Henriksen & Ringmose, 2013:12). However, this is an intentional choice, since these 
are by far the most controversial and criticized drones, and the ones the Obama 
Administration attempts to justify. Although they constitute only a minority, they are 
looked upon with great attention and suspiciousness, because they are connected with 
targeted killings7 and signature strikes8 (Henriksen & Ringmose, 2013:22,44; Alston, 
2010). Additionally non-armed drones are concerned with another debate and therefore 
not a subject for this study. This also means that the Obama Administration does not 
have to justify the use of UAV’s in the same degree as UCAV’s, which makes a focus 
on the articulations of UAV’s less relevant since there are fewer problems linked with 
their use. Another reason why UCAV’s are chosen at the expense of UAV’s is that 
UCAV’s are far more relevant in an IR context. UAV’s primary task is surveillance both 
in domestic and foreign affairs and many countries have UAV capabilities at their 
disposal. Domestic surveillance is outside the delimitation of the project, and counter-
espionage in e.g. wars and conflicts is not a ‘new’ and likewise problematic issue. What 
is more interesting is to study the American articulations of the use armed drones. The 
United States is one of relatively few countries globally who has acquired armed drones 
and presumably the only state that persistently uses them (Henriksen & Ringmose, 2013; 
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The forthcoming section outlines the theoretical and methodological framework of this 
study. The first part provides an introduction to the study’s theoretical point of 
departure, including reflections on the just war tradition and an operationalization of the 
just war principles. Subsequently, focus is directed towards the methodological 
framework of the study and the implications of employing Fairclough’s discourse 
analytical approach to the issue of the U.S. drone program. In closing, the study assesses 
the empirical field of research of the study and the selection of key texts in relation.  
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The just war tradition is a tradition of thought that leads all the way back to Roman and 
Catholic intellectuals in the late antiquity (Rengger, 2002:353). It is a philosophical 
tradition that emphasizes reflection on moral and ethical choices regarding the initiation 
and conduct of war. This study argues that core notions of the just war tradition are 
being used in order to put a certain framing on the presence and use of drones. However, 
the commitment of the just war tradition is not that of validating or invalidating certain 
behavior. At the words of Oliver O'Donovan: “it is very often supposed that just war 
theory undertakes to validate or invalidate particular wars. That would be an impossible 
undertaking.” (O'Donovan, 2003:7). 
 
This study aligns itself with the argument of O'Donovan to the extent that the just war 
tradition is not meant to and should not perform such a task. The distinction between 
valid and invalid behavior depends on how actors perceive the given action and cannot 
be seen as an unbiased standard. Although it cannot ultimately do so, this study argues 
that general principles of the just war tradition are indeed being used in such a manner. 
As the analysis demonstrates, arguments leaning on core elements of the just war 
tradition are being used in order to justify drone use. By engaging in a discourse analysis 
of how the Obama Administration frames drones using just war elements, this study 
simultaneously shows how the application of the just war tradition has expanded to 
much more than moral reflection. Rather than imposing restraints on the initiation and 
conduct of violent behavior, are indeed used discursively to legitimize a certain 
behavior. In this context, the principles of the just war tradition are being used as a 
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validating measure, hereby framing the U.S. drone use as a just and ethically fair act of 
war. In the following sections, the core elements of the just war tradition will be outlined 
along with a presentation of significant developments within the just war tradition.  
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The following section focuses on the specific content and development of the just war 
tradition. A primary starting point of the just war tradition is a distinction between the 
cases of jus ad bellum (how one determines the justice of going to war) and jus in bello9 
(how one determines what one can do in war) (Brunstetter & Braun, 2011:338). 
Embedded in each of the two aforementioned are sets of principles that are to assist in 
assessing the moral and ethical character of certain action. It is important to stress that 
the concept of just war should not be looked upon as a theory of social science; rather it 
is political/philosophical tradition concerned with the moral and ethical questions of 
warfare. Thus, the principles of the just war tradition are not fixed entities, and in the 
history of ideas they have been attributed varied meanings. However, certain general 
notions can be identified within each of the two categories. Jus ad bellum (literally: right 
to war) usually encompasses the following principles: 
 
1. A war can only be waged for a just cause 
2. A war has to be waged with right intentions 
3. A war has to be the last resort  
4. A war must only be waged if there is a reasonable chance of success  
5. A war must only be waged it the good one hopes to obtain outweighs the evil 
that will be caused by the war (the proportionality principle)  
6. The decision to go to war has to be taken by the legitimate authority  
(Childress, 1978:435-438; Orend, 2001:87) 
 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!D!Jus post bellum (how to terminate a war fairly) is occasionally added to feature how war is concluded 
justly, but is not a primary concern of the tradition and will not be discussed in this analysis.!
! ""!
Accordingly, the just war tradition offers two sets of principles related to the jus in bello 
(literally: law in war): 
 
1. One must never intentionally target non-combatants (the discrimination 
principle) 
2. The military advantage obtained with a particular act of war has to outweigh the 
damages this act will cause (the proportionality principle)  
3. An attack or action must be intended to help in the military defeat of the enemy; 
it must be an attack on a military objective. (Military necessity) 
(Childress, 1978:440-441) Moreno-Ocampo 2006:5; Orend, 2001:110-111) 
 
As mentioned previously, the principles of the just war tradition are not fixed or static in 
the sense that they have always been ascribed the same ideational meaning. 
Consequently, it can be debated what each of these categories precisely entail. Though 
the works of just war thinkers such as Augustine, Aquinas and Grotius cannot be said to 
encompass a uniform understanding of the notion of just war, it is nevertheless possible 
to identify some general meanings of the principles (Orend, 2001:87). Within the just 
war tradition, just cause is regularly referred to as “self-defense from an external attack” 
(ibid.:87). Right intention usually embraces creating or restoring just peace, righting a 
wrong or assisting the innocent (ibid.), whereas the principle of last resort stresses that 
states must have exhausted all plausible, peaceful alternatives to resolving the conflict in 
question (ibid.).  
 
In this context, the proportionality principle stands as a central concept of the just war 
tradition and emphasizes that waging a war must at first aim at preventing more evil 
than it causes, i.e. human casualties attained from an action should not exceed the 
casualties of non-action (ibid.). Furthermore, the proportionality principle aims to ensure 
that military objectives are targeted with proportionate force (ibid.). The principle of 
legitimate authority refers to the notion that waging war can only be done by duly 
constituted public authorities (ibid.). Finally, the principle of military necessity stresses 
that it is not sufficient to legitimize killings solely on the grounds that the targets are 
combatants. Additionally, their termination must have military value, i.e. help in the 
military defeat of the enemy (Moreno-Ocampo, 2006:5). See section 2.1.2 for an 
elaboration and operationalization of each principle.  
! "-!
Traditionally, jus ad bellum and jus in bello have been thought of as independent; for 
example, one could engage in a war justly, but conduct it unjustly (Brunstetter & Braun, 
2011:340). In the context of drones, the division between the two is certainly blurred. 
While the conduct of drone employment in Pakistan adheres to the principles of jus in 
bello, the U.S. have not initiated a war with Pakistan. In this respect they are indeed 
independent, but as this study will demonstrate later, the U.S. articulation of drone use is 
regularly based on jus ad bellum vocabulary. For now, it is merely pointed out that the 
distinction between the two provides important moral terminology to engage in the 
analysis of the ethical dilemmas. It is important to stress that these categorical 
definitions are widely open to interpretation. From a discourse analytical perspective, 
the word meaning of just cause or any of the other concepts is not static, but upon for 
discursive negotiations, and thus the principles should not be used to measure or validate 
the justness of a certain behavior.  
 
Nicholas Rengger (2002) makes a historical link between the concepts of the just war 
tradition and the emergence of international humanitarian law (IHL) (Rengger, 
2002:355). He argues that moral and ethical reflections on warfare have in recent times 
been equated to questions of the ‘legality’ of warfare, i.e. the contents of international 
humanitarian law and more specifically that of the ‘laws of war’ (ibid.). A significant 
critique of the just war tradition is however that it fails to adequately encompass the 
spatial character of contemporary conflicts, especially those related to terrorist threats 
(ibid.:362). Michael Walzer, probably the most important figure in the revival of the just 
war tradition after WWII, laid out extremely limited rights of intervention, claiming that 
it could only be morally justifiable in the case of secession, civil war or genocide 
(ibid.:359). It is obvious that these deal with matters inevitably linked to the state, 
whether it is the aggressor or merely incapable of preventing these acts.  
 
Legal scholar Adam Pearlman highlights this issue by stating that “unprecedented 
mobility and adaptability [of the enemy we face] were not considered when formulating 
the key facets of international law” and goes on to claim that violent action “cannot be 
judged by traditional principles that [were] developed in the context of state-to state 
engagements.” (Brunstetter & Braun, 2000:352). The point made here is that the face of 
the combatant and the character of the battlefield have altered and consequently made 
the constraints of IHL a diffuse matter of interpretation. From this perspective, one may 
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argue that the guiding principles of the just war tradition are inapplicable to 
contemporary conflicts between states and non-state actors. However, as this study will 
demonstrate, the notion of just warfare is very much present within the discourses of the 
Obama administration, despite the fact that it seemingly does not comply with these 
alterations. In this sense, the just war tradition has not lost its significance; but rather, it 
is being used in novel ways to legitimize U.S. foreign intervention beyond the hot 
battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan. It thus remains of pivotal importance to consider 
the narratives and perceptions surrounding the U.S. drone program. 
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Section 2.1 has outlined essential characteristics of the just war tradition and briefly 
addressed certain issues the tradition is facing today. As mentioned previously, this 
study argues that the Obama administration seeks to legitimize its use of drones by 
constructing a distinct ideational frame of understanding rooted in the just war tradition. 
In testing this thesis, the present study performs a discourse analysis of the Obama 
Administration’s speeches on drones, identifying how notions of just war are implicitly 
or explicitly linked to the articulation of the U.S. drone program. In this context, the 
principles of the just war tradition function as a series of concepts, which will be used in 
classifying statements and discourses related to the U.S. drone use.  
  
The discourse analysis is structured around these principles in categorical terms. Thus, 
the analysis includes sections concerned with how the principles of just cause, right 
intention, proportionality, discrimination etc. are apparent within the drone discourses 
of the Obama administration. In conducting such an examination, this study applies the 
discourse analytical framework of Norman Fairclough, as specified in the forthcoming 
section 2.3. While the principles of the just war tradition should be understood as 
conceptual categories for the analysis, Fairclough’s terminology serve as analytical tools 
in assessing to what extent the arguments of the Obama Administration are linked to 
these principles. 
 
The main goal of this section is to outline the use of the just war principles as 
operational definitions and make clear how they can be identified within the speeches of 
the Obama administration. As mentioned earlier, jus ad bellum and jus in bello have 
traditionally been thought of as independent dimensions of the just war tradition; 
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however, in the context of U.S. drone use, the division is blurred. Consequently, the two 
dimensions of the just war tradition will not be approached as direct counterparts in the 
analysis. As the analysis will show, the Obama administration draws heavily on 
concepts from both jus ad bellum and jus in bello when legitimizing their use of drones, 
and in doing so, the distinction between the two is not clearly articulated.  
 
The concepts from the just war tradition can be identified within the discourses of the 
Obama Administration to a varying extent. However, there is a variation between 
explicit and implicit occurrences of the different notions. Some of the principles, e.g. the 
proportionality principle and the principle of last resort, are explicitly used with 
reference to the just war tradition by the Obama administration. Other principles, such as 
the principle of just cause and right intention, are on the other hand predominantly 
implicit in the discursive framing of the legitimacy of U.S. drone use. Consequently, it is 
necessary to explicate how different statements are categorized in the forthcoming 
analysis with reference to the just war tradition. The categorical differentiation between 
the different concepts is an analytical decision made to clarify how each principle is 
apparent within the speeches; however, it is necessary to stress that the concepts are 
sometimes articulated together in practice, hereby blurring the clear distinction between 
the articulation of particular concepts, e.g. the concept of proportionality on the one 
hand and the principle of discrimination on the other. In these cases, the analysis will 
elucidate how these statements can be interpreted as references to several just war 
principles, and how these principles relate to each other within the discourse.  
 
The following sections briefly outline how the different concepts occur in the texts, but 
it is necessary to stress that the full line of reasoning behind the interpretations of 
political statements will not be unfolded until the analysis.  
 
/"!"/"! !"#$%&'"#(%
As mentioned previously, the principle of a just cause traditionally embodies self-
defense from an external attack or immanent danger (Orend, 2001:87). Thus, statements 
concerned with U.S. drone use as acts of self-defense from an ‘imminent’ terrorist threat 
are categorized in accordance with the just cause principle throughout the analysis. In 
this context, it is necessary to stress, that the occurrences of the just cause principle is 
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predominantly implicit within the discourses of the Obama administration, unlike 
several of the other concepts.  Accordingly, a statement claiming that U.S. drone strikes 
counter a “continuing and imminent threat to the American people” (Obama, 2013:6) 
can be said to construct a just cause for U.S. targeted strikes, because of the imminence 
of the terrorist threat towards the American people. The statement implicitly refers to 
U.S. actions as acts of self-defense; framing U.S. targeted strikes as just acts of war 
aimed at protecting the lives of U.S. citizens. 
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The principle of right intention is related to the U.S. framing of a just cause concerning 
drone use and traditionally embraces creating or restoring peace, righting a wrong or 
assisting the innocent (Orend, 2001:87). The principle of right intention encompasses 
altruistic reflections related to the act of war, where the protection of ‘the innocent’ is a 
core issue.  Thus, it is argued in the analysis that statements championing that “to do 
nothing in the face of terrorist networks would invite far more civilian casualties” 
(Obama, 2013) can be said to frame the intentions behind U.S. drone use as altruistic, 
constructing the main purpose as one concerned with saving the lives of innocents 
regardless of citizenship.  
/"!"/"6 /'#$%0(#.0$%%
The principle of last resort encompasses the need to have exhausted plausible and 
peaceful alternatives before waging war (Orend, 2001:87). Consequently, proclamations 
framing U.S. drone strikes as the last possible alternative arguably fall under this 
category, e.g. Brennan’s claim that “lethal force might be the only remaining option to 
address the threat and prevent an attack.” (Brennan, 2012). Statements stressing that 
diplomatic negotiations with Al Qaeda are impossible or that the host countries 
governments are unable or unwilling to address the threat can additionally be said to 
draw upon this principle of last resort.  
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When arguing that statements refer to the reasonable chance of success of the war 
against Al Qaeda and their affiliates, the analysis focuses on the prominence of 
statements asserting that the drone campaign makes it achievable to defeat this terrorist 
threat. Articulations that fall under this category include Brennan’s claim that Al Qaeda 
will fade into history over time as the result of U.S. actions (Brennan, 2012) and 
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Obama’s pronouncement that the U.S. “must finish the work of defeating Al Qaeda and 
its associated forces” (Obama, 2013.). These sort of statements discursively frame the 
current conflict as a war that it is possible to win, and can thus be said to champion the 
notion that drone use enhances U.S. chance of success. 
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Legitimate authority refers to the notion that waging war should only be done by duly 
constituted public authorities (Orend, 2001:87). In this study, references to specific laws 
will be encompassed within this category. Hence, references such as “Ten years later, 
the AUMF [Authorization for Use of Military Force] remains on the books, and it is still 
a viable authorization today” (Johnson, 2012), will be included in this category. 
References to the AUMF constructs a notion of the U.S. President as the legitimate 
authority to act against Al Qaeda.  
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The principle of proportionality adheres to both jus ad bellum and jus in bello. The 
concept emphasizes that acts of war should prevent more evil than it causes; in other 
words, casualties attained from an action should not exceed the casualties of non-action. 
Throughout the analysis, the Obama administration makes both explicit and implicit 
references to this concept of proportionality; “targeted strikes conform to the principle 
of proportionality” (Brennan, 2012). In the speeches it is claimed that the military 
advantages of targeted strikes clearly outweigh the collateral damage of these military 
actions.  
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The discrimination principle adheres to the notion that one must never intentionally 
target non-combatants, i.e. civilians. Thus, statements proclaiming that drones offer an 
“unprecedented ability […] to precisely target a military objective while minimizing 
collateral damage” (Brennan, 2012) are argued in accordance with the principle of 
discrimination, since such assertions can be said to construct an image of U.S. drone use 
as clean, efficient, precise and without civilian casualties. As the analysis will 
demonstrate, it will be stressed that the clear distinction between the concept of 
proportionality and discrimination is blurred, and that the concepts are inherently linked 
to each other within the discourse concerning drone use.  
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In accordance with the principle of military necessity, an attack or action must only be 
targeted toward a military objective and with the intent to help in the defeat of this 
enemy (Moreno-Ocampo, 2006). When the analysis argues that key persons from the 
Obama Administration refer to the principle of necessity, this encompasses statements 
concerned with framing the identity of targets as legitimate military combatants of 
military value. An example of military necessity could be “Targeted strikes conform to 
the principle of necessity, the requirement that the targets have definite value.”  
(Brennan, 2012). 
 
In sum, this categorical operationalization of the just war principles is usable when 
classifying discursive constructs about the U.S. drone program. Again, it is necessary to 
stress that the above-mentioned classifications should be understood as a conceptual 
framework that is helpful when assessing the thesis of this project; yet as the analysis 
will show, the distinction between the articulations of different concepts is sometimes 
blurred in practice. 
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The forthcoming section provides an assessment of the methodological framework of 
this study’s discourse analysis. This includes a discussion of considerations concerning 
the use of Fairclough’s analytical framework in relation to the constructivist disposition 
of the thesis, as well as an operationalization of Fairclough’s linguistic terminology. 
Following the overview of the discourse analytical framework, the chapter discusses the 
selection of speeches for the discourse analysis and the delimitation of the empirical 
research field.  
 
This study aligns itself with the ontological and epistemological outlook of Fairclough’s 
critical realist discourse analysis, hereby stressing the dialectic relationship between the 
practice of discourse and what he calls other elements in the social process or social 
structure (Fairclough, 2010:501; Fairclough, 1992:64). Thus, it is assumed that an 
external reality exists regardless of our knowledge of it (Fairclough, 2001:64). 
“Discourse contributes to the constitution of all those dimensions of social structure, 
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which directly or indirectly shape and constrain it: its own norms and conventions, as 
well as the relations, identities, and institutions, which lie behind them” (Fairclough, 
1992:64). In other words, discourse is not only a practice of representing the world, but 
also of signifying, constituting and constructing the world in meaning (ibid.). In this 
respect, this study argues that discourses of American drone use affect social structures.  
 
The discourse analysis of this study is hereby preoccupied with how knowledge, truth 
and facts are produced and prioritized, how these “facts are dependent upon particular 
discursive framing of the issue in question” (Hansen, 2006:22) and that this framing 
contributes to the construction of both social identities, social relations between people 
and systems of knowledge and beliefs (Fairclough, 2001:64). Poststructuralists such as 
Lene Hansen (2006) and David Campbell (1992) place their primary focus on identity. 
However, this study suggests a different approach by including the relational and 
ideational functions of discourse presented by Fairclough. As mentioned previously, this 
study examines how the Obama administration seeks to legitimize its use of drones by 
constructing a distinct ideational frame of understanding rooted in the just war tradition. 
The core focus is hereby on the systems of knowledge and beliefs related to U.S. drone 
use and the ideational effects of discourse, while the identity and relational dimensions 
are given less attention.  
 
By adopting the critical realist outlook of Fairclough, this study concurrently sets itself 
apart from the positivist epistemological outlook of rationalist theories of IR. The 
knowledge and conclusions of this project are generated within a particular social 
context; consequently, they are not ahistorical or universal entities. When this study 
argues that drone use is being legitimized by drawing on concepts of the just war 
tradition, this is not to be understood as a universal conclusion in rationalistic sense. The 
conclusions of the study are case specific in spatial and temporal terms and thus cannot 
be separated from the specific focus on U.S. foreign policy and the Obama 
administration.  
 
Furthermore, it is necessary to emphasize that this study refrains from making causal 
claims about the relationship between discursive representations of U.S. drone use and 
the actual politics of the drone program. It would have been interesting to study a 
possible divergence between the U.S. foreign policy discourses of drone use and the 
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actual drone program. From a critical realist perspective, there is no tangibly given 
causal relationship between discursive representations and what Fairclough coins ‘other 
elements in the social process’ on the other (Fairclough, 1992:64). Thus, it is possible 
that the discursive representations apparent in the speeches of the Obama administration 
set themselves apart from the actual drone campaign; however, it is nearly impossible to 
obtain reliable knowledge concerning the concrete policies of U.S. drone use because of 
its clandestine nature. In other words, this study refrains from commenting on a possible 
correlation or divergence between practice of discourse and social practice. From this 
perspective, one may argue that the methodology of this project is more poststructuralist 
than critical realist. 
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In sum, the discourse analysis of this project contributes by demonstrating how U.S. 
drone use is legitimized through a particular framing of the just war tradition, and that 
this discursive framing constructs both social identities, social relations and systems of 
knowledge and beliefs. This section outlines the considerations on the choice of 
Fairclough’s text and discourse analysis as methodological framework for this study. It 
explains the use of select parts of his critical discourse analysis that are included in the 
study’s analysis.  The section will also provide an elaboration on how the terminology is 
applied to the present study. Finally, it provides an operationalization of the central 
theoretical terms of discourse analysis relevant to this study. It should be emphasized 
that Fairclough has presented a vast number of theoretical terms linked to his critical 
discourse analysis during his scholarship (Fairclough, 1989; 1994; 2001; 2010). 
Therefore, only linguistic terminology regarding discourse analysis relevant to this study 
will be discussed throughout this section, along with a reflection on significant 
exclusions.  
 
A prevailing issue in applying Fairclough’s terminology to this study is his emphasis on 
the constructive effect of discourses (Fairclough, 1992:24). He claims that discourses are 
constituent (ibid.:3) and affects the realities beyond discourses (Fairclough, 2010:501). 
The dialectic relationship between discourse and what he calls other elements in the 
social process or social structure is very central to Fairclough because of his critical 
! -H!
realist outlook (ibid.:47; Fairclough 1992:64). This study investigates to what extend the 
Obama Administration legitimizes its use of drones through certain articulations. The 
aim is not what the consequences of a given legitimization are on the actual drone 
campaign in the Middle East, nor on how this discourse influence the future drone 
politics of other countries.   
 
The core focus of this study is solely on the articulations within discourses or the 
language dimension (Fairclough, 2010:476). Accordingly, the analysis does not partake 
in the assessment of the dialectic relationship between discourse and social structures. 
This decision not to assess the relationship between practice of discourse and the social 
practice is arguably in agreement with the pluralist notion of critical realist 
methodology. As Fairclough says himself: "[…] there is not set procedure for doing 
discourse analysis; people approach it in different ways according to the specific nature 
of the project, as well as their own views of discourse” (Fairclough, 1992:225).   
 
The thesis of this study deals with the discursive dimension of American drone use. 
Because of the specific case of drones and the clandestine nature of the U.S. drone 
program the study opts out of the critical analysis of the relationship between discursive 
practice and social practice. Thus, it is the problem statement that refrains this study 
from examining the ‘extra-discursive’.  
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One of the main reasons for choosing Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis as a 
framework for this study is his focus on the linguistics of discourse. Hence, the main 
objective for Fairclough is to develop a linguistic analysis of discourse, which is both 
theoretically and practically usable (Fairclough, 1992:1). In the context of this study, the 
specific focus on language and linguistics makes it possible to evaluate the extent to 
which the just war tradition is being used within the discourses of the Obama 
administration. This sort of assessment is made possible through Fairclough’s focus on 
linguistic analysis on the textual level, and would arguably not have been possible to the 
same degree if the study had adopted a different discourse analytical approach. In this 
context, one may argue that the poststructuralist theoretical framework provided by 
Laclau & Mouffe could have been relevant for this study; however, it fails to provide the 
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linguistic terminology necessary to approach the thesis. Thus, Fairclough’s discourse 
analysis, focusing on both the linguistic level of texts and the broader discursive practice 
has been chosen as the most suitable framework for this study.  
 
According to Fairclough, discourse is a practice not just of representing the world, but of 
signifying the world, constituting and constructing the world in meaning (ibid.:64). 
Fairclough distinguishes between three aspects of the constructive effects of discourses 
in this context (ibid.). Discourses contribute to both the construction of social identities, 
social relations between people and systems of knowledge and beliefs (ibid.). Thus, 
these correspond to three functions of discourse: the identity function relates to how 
social identities are set up in a discourse, the relational function to how social 
relationships between discourse participants are enacted and negotiated and the 
ideational function to ways in which texts signify the world and its processes, entities 
and relations (ibid.).  The three functions of language is used during the analysis of the 
speeches to illustrate how the discursive framing of U.S. drone use constructs distinct 
identities, relations and systems of truth. 
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In this study, the discourse analysis combines linguistic analysis on the textual level and 
a broader analysis of discursive practice (Fairclough, 1992:4). Even though text and 
discursive practice are presented as two different analytical dimensions by Fairclough, 
the distinction between them is not a sharp one (ibid.:74). One never really investigates 
the features of a text without some reference to the text production and/or interpretation 
(ibid.:73). Fairclough uses the term text as “any product whether written or spoken” 
(ibid.:4). When analyzing a text one always has to address language forms and questions 
of meaning simultaneously (ibid.:74). The terms modality, transitivity, word meaning 
and wording are all relevant to the text analysis of this study, and a brief 
operationalization of these terms is provided in the forthcoming section.  
 
Modality covers the degree of affinity (commitment/endorsement) between the text 
producer and a proposition/statement (ibid.:158). The statement “Targeted strikes 
conform to the principle of necessity” (Brennan, 2012) is an example of categorical 
modality. And example with less modality could be “[drones] might actually have a 
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clearer picture of the target and its surroundings” (Brennan, 2012). The word ‘might’ 
functions as a ‘hedge’, which tones down the affinity to the statement. Other examples 
of hedges are ‘a bit’, ‘sort of’ and ‘or something’. Any statement has the property of 
modality, or is modalized (Fairclough, 1992:158.). Categorical modality often implies 
some form of power (ibid.:159). Lower degree of modality is also apparent when the 
expressions are questionable, e.g. ‘I think’ or ‘I doubt’. Modality is a major dimension 
of discourse (ibid.:160). Modality is used in the discourse analysis to investigate to what 
extent the affinity of propositions is contested and open to struggle and transformation.  
 
Transitivity deals with the relationship between agents and actions/processes in 
sentences. (ibid.:178).  The objective is to investigate whether statements are connected 
to a particular agent and if it is made active or passive (ibid.:235). Transitivity 
contributes by uncovering the expressions of causality, agency and the attribution of 
responsibility (ibid.:236) in the different speeches. There is a big difference between the 
use of active and passive agents in the speeches. The statement “when considering lethal 
force we ask ourselves whether the individual poses a significant threat to U.S. 
interests.” (Brennan, 2012) contains an active agent because of the word ‘we’. In this 
manner, the use of lethal force is connected to an agent ‘we’. On the contrary the 
statement, “it is hard to imagine a tool that can better minimize the risk to civilians than 
remotely piloted aircraft.” (Brennan, 2012), contains a passive agent. The first statement 
highlights that careful professionals evaluate targeting procedures, whereas the latter 
ascribes a highly discriminate character to drones themselves. Thus, transitivity is used 
to examine what or who certain processes or occurrences are ascribed to. 
 
According to Fairclough, the meaning of words is not constant, and the relationship 
between words and meanings is many-to-one rather than one-to-one in both directions 
(Fairclough, 1992:184) Thus, the word meaning of drones depend on the discursive 
framing surrounding it; it can be understood as a ‘machine of war’ or a ‘clinical tool’. 
The multiplicity of meanings is called a word’s meaning potential (ibid.) and a shift in 
the meaning potential of a word can be an indicator of discursive contestations and small 
changes in discursive formation (ibid.:184-185).  
 
Another term of Fairclough that is used in this study is wording. Different perspectives 
of experience entail different ways of wording them (ibid.:191). Instances of wording 
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occur frequently in the speeches. Brennan (2012) states that U.S. forces are expected to 
‘remove’ terrorists from the battlefield, another choice of words could have been to 
more directly ‘defeat’ or ‘kill’ the terrorists. Obama (2013) follow the line of articulation 
and states that Al Qaeda commanders have been ‘taken off’ the battlefield. Other kinds 
of wording are the ‘tool’ or ‘technology’ when referring to drones. A metaphor is a 
specific kind of wording. According to Fairclough, metaphors structure what people 
think and systems of knowledge and belief in a pervasive and fundamental way 
(Fairclough, 1992:194). 
 
2.3.1.2 ;$.91-.$A%(0-39,$9% 
Whereas Fairclough’s textual analysis focuses specifically on the linguistics of specific 
texts, the discursive practice involves processes of text production, distribution and 
consumption (Fairclough 1992.:78). Due to the thesis, this study’s analysis of the 
discursive practice is predominantly concerned with text production and distribution, 
whereas the consumption dimension is excluded. It would only be relevant to include the 
latter if the aim of the study is to examine how specific articulations were interpreted by 
others; however, this is not the case. 
 
Analysis of the discursive practice of the issue at hand, i.e. the Obama administrations 
articulation of drones, allows for a broader assessment of the discursive tendencies 
uncovered in the textual analysis. When assessing the discursive practice within a 
particular order of discourse, Fairclough presents the two main concepts of 
interdiscursivity and intertextuality. In this context, an order of discourse should be 
understood as the total configurations of discursive practices in particular institutions 
(ibid.:9). The Obama administration and the total number of articulations, i.e. speeches 
and the legal memo The White Paper related to U.S. drone use, constitute the order of 
discourse. The concept of interdiscursivity is preoccupied with how discourses draw 
upon other discourses, hereby reproducing and reconfiguring them (ibid.:232). In this 
study, the concept of interdiscursivity is used to highlight how the Obama administration 
do not exclusively draw on principles of the just war tradition when legitimizing drones. 
Thus, the assessment of the discursive practice of the study shows that the Obama 
Administration also other lines of reasoning, including historic precedent and domestic 
statutory principles.  
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The concept of intertextuality refers to how texts relate to each other both within and 
beyond the order of discourse, and is both a matter of production and distribution 
(ibid.:84). Regarding production, an intertextuality perspective emphasizes the 
historicity of texts, how they always constitute additions to existing chains of speech 
communication (ibid.:232-233). In the context of this study, the notion of intertextuality 
will be used to explore how different speeches relate to each other within the order of 
discourse, and how these speeches make intertextual references to the just war tradition 
in their attempt to legitimize U.S. drone use. If these references are made explicitly 
within the texts, e.g. when John Brennan directly refers to the principle of 
proportionality in relation to U.S. drone use (Brennan, 2012), one may argue that it is a 
case of what Fairclough calls manifest intertextuality. In terms of distribution, 
intertextuality is used to investigate how the different speeches and The White Paper 
draw upon each other to a high extent, and can thus be said to constitute a consistent 
discourse concerning drone use (ibid.:84).  
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As mentioned in the introduction, the problem statement of this study is approached 
through an interpretative discourse analysis of different speeches by key persons from 
the Obama Administration and an additional analysis of The White Paper on drone use. 
This section seeks to explicate the study’s empirical concerns and hereby provide an 
introduction to the texts that constitute the basis of the forthcoming analysis. In doing so, 
it is necessary to stress that the methodological framework provided by Fairclough does 
not say anything about the research agenda of the study in itself. Fairclough does not 
provide specific guidelines for the selection of texts when it comes to foreign policy 
discourse analysis within the field of IR, and thus this study seeks guidance elsewhere. 
With regard to the latter, this study draws upon the methodology of Lene Hansen 
regarding textual selection and delimitation of the empirical research field (Hansen, 
2006:82ff.). 
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Inevitably, it is the core focus and research design of the study that ultimately defines 
what texts should be selected for the analysis. With reference to Lene Hansens four 
dimensions of poststructuralist research design, the focus of a study is defined through 
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“choices along the dimensions of intertextuality, Self, time and events/concepts” 
(Hansen, 2006:82). These four dimensions of the study’s research design need to be 
taken into consideration as lines of demarcation for the selection of texts. 
 
The dimension of intertextuality concerns whether the study focuses on official foreign 
policy discourse or expands the scope to include a broader spectrum of opposing 
political discourses, media discourses, etc. (ibid.). As mentioned previously, this study 
focuses specifically on the foreign policy discourses of the Obama Administration, thus 
demarcating the relevant choice of texts significantly. During Obama’s presidency, there 
has been a significant increase in U.S. use of drone strikes (New America Foundation, 
2013), which underlines the relevance of focusing specifically on how the Obama 
Administration articulates this development. The decision not to expand the scope of the 
analysis to include opposing discourses is justified on the basis of the spatial limitations 
of this study. 
 
This study is hereby, with Lene Hansens words, a single-Self study (Hansen, 2006:77). 
The ambition is to uncover to what extent the Obama Administration justifies U.S. drone 
use through the ideational concept of just warfare; not to perform a comparative analysis 
of how other states, i.e. Selves, may perceive this. Consequently, the relevant body of 
texts is narrowed down to include only official foreign policy speeches, produced by key 
persons within the Obama Administration. 
 
While the two previous dimensions of the study’s research design demarcate the choice 
of texts in spatial terms, it is also necessary to consider the temporal perspective of text 
selection. This study focuses specifically on the contemporary foreign policy discourses 
related to U.S. drone use. In this respect, the temporal delimitation of the discourse 
analysis and selection of texts are fixed within the duration of Barack Obamas 
presidency. As clarified above, this temporal limitation is grounded in statistics showing 
a significant increase in U.S. drone strikes during the presidency of Obama (New 
America Foundation, 2013). 
 
Finally, this study’s specific focus on the articulation and legitimization of the U.S. 
drone program provides another significant demarcation in spatial terms. As Lene 
Hansen points out, discourse analysis is often “generated by a focus on Selves or on a 
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particular event” (Hansen 2006:81). Thus, one may argue that however, this project 
adopts a different focus, making the discursive framing of the U.S. drone program the 
central object of analysis. This provides another significant demarcation for the selection 
of texts. Thus, only official foreign policy texts that explicitly or implicitly touch upon 
U.S. drone use and its legitimacy is relevant for the analysis.  
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As mentioned in the previous section, the four dimensions of a study’s research design 
function as general demarcations for the selection of texts in spatial and temporal terms. 
There are a variety of textual genres that may be relevant within the confinements of the 
above-mentioned research design. However, not all texts are equally relevant in foreign 
policy analysis. With reference to Lene Hansen, selected texts should be “characterized 
by the clear articulation of identities and policies”, they should be “widely read and 
attended to” and finally, they should have “the formal authority to define a political 
position.”  (Hansen, 2006:85).  
 
According to Hansen, these criteria for textual selection have different methodological 
and analytical capabilities. Well-defined articulation of identities and policies within 
texts make it easier to operationalize the analytical framework, whereas the ‘widely-
read’-criteria guarantees that the texts at hand have a significant role in defining 
discourses (Hansen, 2006:85). Finally, the ‘formal authority’-criteria denotes the 
constructivist assumption that authority is linked to knowledge and power (ibid.) This 
set of criteria functions as the general guideline for textual selection in this project along 
with the analytical demarcations of the research field.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the key texts of this study include official foreign policy speeches 
by political figures within the Obama Administration as well as The White Paper on the 
legality of drone use (See appendix for full list of texts). Firstly, the speeches are 
generally characterized by a clear articulation of the topic at hand, i.e. U.S. foreign 
policy and the legitimacy of drone use, targeted strikes, signature strikes etc. Secondly, 
they meet the criteria of being widely attended to. While President Barack Obama’s 
speech on U.S. drone use and counterterrorism policies may be more influential than 
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those of John Brennan10 and Harold Koh11, their speeches are still heavily cited within 
the mainstream media. Furthermore, John Brennan and Harold Koh can be said to hold 
significant positions, and in turn score high on the ‘formal authority’-criteria.  
 
Though the primary empirical foundation of this study consists of political speeches 
from key persons of the Obama Administration, an analysis of The White Paper on 
drone use is also included. Whereas the speeches of the Obama Administration seek to 
justify the U.S. drone program toward the public, The White Paper is a legal memo from 
within the Obama Administration that seeks to provide a legal framework for “the 
circumstances in which the U.S. Government could use lethal forces in a foreign country 
outside the area of active hostilities […]”. The document was not meant to be leaked 
and thus it does not seemingly meet the criteria of being widely attended to. However, it 
arguably scores high on both the clear articulation aspect as well as the formal authority 
aspect, given that it constitutes an authoritative political voice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 John Brennan was the White House Deputy National Security Advisor for Homeland Security and 
Counterterrorism 2009-2013. 
11 Harold Koh was the Legal Adviser of the Department of State 2009-2013.!
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In the forthcoming analysis, this study implements the previously mentioned theoretical 
and methodological framework into a discourse analysis of the United States’ drone use. 
The overall purpose of the section is to illustrate and discuss to what extend the Obama 
Administration utilizes the just war tradition in its legitimization of drone use. It is 
demonstrated that the principles of the just war tradition are highly present in the line of 
arguments of the Obama Administration, some more that others. It is a general tendency 
that the Obama Administration substantiates their arguments in different just war 
principles in order to strengthen the legitimization of drone use. The analysis is 
structured around the principles of just war, which constitutes subsections. This analysis 
is followed by a section on the discursive practice in which the overall drone discourse 
of the Obama Administration is discussed. 
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This initial section assesses to what extent the concept of just cause is used discursively 
to legitimize U.S. drone use. Just cause is a fundamental notion of the just war tradition 
inasmuch as it deals with somewhat overall questions of waging war; questions that 
inevitably arise at an early stage of war consideration. Hence, the category serves as the 
starting point of this analysis. As the following will demonstrate, the principle of just 
cause is frequently present in the articulations of American drone use.  
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Generally speaking, mentions related to a just cause are apparent in this study’s entire 
empirical field to a high extent. The appearances of ‘just cause’ references are rarely 
explicit, but they are embedded in statements about the “inherent right of national self-
defense” (Brennan, 2012), of countering a “continuing and imminent threat to the 
American people” (Obama, 2013:6) and an established correlation between the attacks 
of 9/11 and the legality of America’s actions (Obama, 2013:6).  
 
The United States were attacked by terrorists on 9/11, which set in motion an American 
war on terror connected to these attacks. Consequently, U.S. officials call upon the 
principle of self-defense in relation to the continuous threat of terrorism, hereby drawing 
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on a core element of the just cause principle. Conducting and validating actions of self-
defense logically implies a pre-existing threat. Hence, in order to use arguments of self-
defense, one must first account for a threat.  
 
In The White Paper it reads “[…] force would be lawful […] [if] targeted individual 
poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States” (White Paper, 
2013:1). The White Paper is a legal document, and thus a high extent of affinity is to be 
expected. The manner in which this issue is addressed above embeds an almost fact-like 
status. However, the question addressed in this relation, whether force is indeed lawful 
or not, lies at the very core of current legal debates, as accounted for in the introduction. 
President Obama takes an equivalent stance: “[…] we act against terrorists who pose a 
continuing and imminent threat to the American people.” (Obama, 2013:6). The use of 
the words ‘imminent’ and ‘continuous’ is crucial, because it entrenches U.S. drone use 
to the principles of ‘just cause’. As mentioned in section 2.1 on the just war tradition, the 
principle of ‘just cause’ encompasses notions of averting an imminent danger.  
 
The construction of an ‘imminent’ threat entails a logic necessity for pre-emptive 
strikes, since these are able to counteract such imminent danger. In this context, it is 
relevant to mention the general debate concerned with how the concept of imminence 
should be understood. Thus, critics of the former U.S. administration argued that the 
proclaimed ‘pre-emptive actions’ of the Bush Administration was in fact ‘preventive 
action’, since the threat posed by adversaries could not be considered imminent 
(Kroening, 2003). This debate is certainly central to the question of drone use. However, 
it is beyond the scope of this project to assess whether or not the terrorist threat of Al 
Qaeda poses an imminent threat to U.S. citizens in practice; it requires a scrutiny that 
cannot be undertaken within the delimitations of this project. Rather, the focus of this 
study is how the notion of imminence is constructed within the discourse in order to 
legitimize current actions, without questioning whether this danger can in fact be 
characterized as imminent in practice. In doing so, it is highlighted how action taken 
against an ‘imminent threat of violent attack’ adheres to the principle of just cause. ‘We 
act’ ascribes these efforts to the Obama Administration, thereby becoming an active 
agent in the sentence. In this manner, they become ‘guardians’ of the American people, 
which they are responsible of protecting. Confronting an imminent threat to the United 
States is constructed as a just cause, because it is an act of self-defense.  
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The choice of the word ‘imminent’ emphasizes a temporal constraint on action. It 
stresses how effective and immediate action is necessary in order to cope with this 
threat. The White Paper underlines this obligation: “[...] the nation may have a limited 
window of opportunity within which to strike in a manner that both has a high likelihood 
of success and reduces the probability of American casualties.” (White Paper 2013:8). 
This point highlights an essential function of drones. They respond to the need for taking 
advantage of a ‘limited window of opportunity’ because they are able to employ lethal 
force within a limited temporal span, i.e. deal with an imminent danger. When 
emphasizing the imminent character of the threat, it follows the logic that swift and 
effective counter-means are needed. This is where drones enter the picture and are 
constructed as ‘just’ response to the threat. John Brennan, chief counter-terrorism 
advisor to President Obama, elaborates on the prudent choice of drones because of 
geography, time and precision (Brennan, 2011). Drones fill out exactly these needs, he 
argues.  This point will be elaborated later in the context of proportionality, 
discrimination and military necessity.  
 
On the topic of Al Qaeda’s current capabilities, and thereby the current threat, Brennan 
argues that the organization “[…] still retains the intent and capability to attack the 
United States and our allies”. (Brennan 2011:2). Obama strengthens this point: “So this 
is the current threat – lethal yet less capable al Qaeda affiliates; threats to diplomatic 
facilities and businesses abroad; homegrown extremists. This is the future of terrorism.” 
(Obama, 2013). Although less capable, the argument is that Al Qaeda maintains 
capabilities to attack the U.S., which strengthens the just cause of confronting such an 
enemy. The framing of this threat as a ‘continuous one’ also holds certain associations. 
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 happened more than 12 years ago, and questions could be 
raised as to the continuous validity of the extended mandate followed by 9/11. 
Obviously, this is not a discussion this study will pick up on. However, the framing of 
the ‘continuous’ character of the terrorist threat allows for the continuous relevance of 
this extensive kind of authority. It does not specifically relate to the drone program in 
the way ‘imminence’ does, but is significant because it preserves a threat that is a pre-
condition for violent engagement. Should this terrorist threat diminish or even cease to 
exist, it would inevitably call for reconsideration of this right and of the drone program. 
By rhetorically maintaining the presence of a continuous and imminent threat, the 
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authority this threat entails persists and the justification of continuous efforts taken 
against imminent terrorist threats can be maintained. In other words, the framing of the 
scale and character of the threat allows for the United States to practice their right to 
self-defense as a just cause.  
 
The Obama Administration relies on a high degree of categorical modality when 
addressing the threat posed by the terrorists and the inherent right to self-defense of the 
United States. It is emphasized how Al Qaeda remains a crucial security threat, 
wherefore the U.S. consequently are in their full right to self-defense. The rhetoric is 
that if Al Qaeda were to possess the competency to attack the United States, they 
certainly would do so. From this logic, the U.S. inevitably and lawfully has to counter 
such occurrences.  
 
Evidently, the emphasis on the continuous and imminent character of the terrorist threat 
signifies a high degree of intertextuality between public speeches and the internal legal 
memo. Thus, the framing of an imminent threat in order to establish a just cause for U.S. 
drone use is pivotal throughout the entire empirical field of research. The Al Qaeda is 
thus persistently framed as an imminent threat engaged in “constant plotting against the 
United States” (White Paper, 2013); a threat that poses a “direct danger to us” (Obama, 
2013) and thus “retains the intent and capability to attack the United States and our 
allies” (Brennan, 2011). This discursive framing of an imminent threat is crucial 
because it arguably constructs the foundation of a just cause for U.S. foreign 
intervention and drone use. Furthermore, imminence inevitably becomes linked to 
drones because of the temporal dimensions related to the threat.  
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At its core, counter-terrorism efforts are concerned with protecting the nation. In this 
respect, American drone use aims at enhancing the security of the United States and to 
protect American lives. The just war principle of right intention traditionally 
encompasses the intention of creating or restoring just peace, righting a wrong or 
assisting the innocent (Orend, 2001:87). Just cause and right intention are to a certain 
extent linked, as accounted for in section 2.1 on the just war tradition. In the present 
! 9-!
analysis, the categorical distinctions are made between a just cause based on the right of 
the state to self-defense, and the more altruistic character of right intention. While just 
cause deals with ‘protecting the nation’ and legitimizing action because American lives 
are endangered, right intention deals explicitly with a de-territorialized and solidaristic 
perspective on human lives. Thus, a right intention is established in argumentation that 
action is taken to protect ‘civilians’ or ‘innocents’ regardless of their national belonging. 
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More specifically, it is frequently emphasized how targeting Al Qaeda and associated 
forces are to save lives in the long run. John Brennan expresses: “We also carefully 
consider the costs of inaction and whether a decision not to carry out a strike could 
allow a terrorist attack to proceed and potentially kill scores of innocents” (Brennan, 
2012). In this respect, American efforts against Al Qaeda construct an understanding of 
the intention of drone use as a right intention; that is, saving innocent lives. The right 
intention of taking out terrorists thus becomes not only a matter of protecting national 
citizens, but also gains an altruistic ‘humanitarian’ appeal, because it becomes a matter 
of defending the innocent. Brennan thus outlines a positive causal relation between 
efforts against Al Qaeda and the saving of human lives. This argument is cemented by 
President Obama: “Remember that the terrorists we are after target civilians, and the 
death toll from their acts of terrorism against Muslims dwarfs any estimate of civilian 
casualties from drone strikes”12 (Obama, 2013). In the relation to right intention, it 
evidently supports the argument that drone strikes all in all reduce death counts. It draws 
on the same linguistic instruments as when it is argued that Al Qaeda certainly would 
attack the United States whenever possible, a relationship associated with the just cause 
principle as demonstrated above. However, the statement does not center on protecting 
American lives, but ‘innocents’ on a general notion. The peculiar part is how ‘death toll’ 
and ‘estimate of civilian casualties’ essentially refer to the same thing: the amount of 
deaths caused by violent acts from either sides of the conflict. The wording draws a 
sharp line between the murderous agenda of the terrorists and the rightful acts of the 
United States, the former producing deaths from malevolent acts and the latter 
unfortunately entailing a confined amount of unintended civilian casualties. This !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"-!B;/!2%5%/7/$%!502'!&/1/&2!%'!%;/!4&'4'&%+'$50+%K!4&+$*+40/?!5$(!F+00!6/!(+2*)22/(!1&'7!%;+2!4/&24/*%+G/!+$!2/*%+'$!9,<!
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supports the point that American drone strikes decrease the overall amount of civilian 
casualties and are thus rooted in a right intention.  
 
As with a vast number of the statements made by the Obama Administration, this 
argumentation is directed at the question of civilian casualties inflicted by drone strikes. 
The exact number of casualties of drone strikes is highly contested (Henriksen & 
Ringmose, 2013), just as it is impossible to contemplate on the amount of American 
lives saved by these strikes. Nevertheless, Obama reinforces the previous statement 
when expressing: “To do nothing in the face of terrorist networks would invite far more 
civilian casualties.” (Obama, 2013:7). Again, American lethal actions are linguistically 
aligned to a right intention, because they aim to reduce the total amount of civilian 
casualties.  
 
The previous quote mentions ‘terrorist networks’. In other relations, denotations of Al 
Qaeda include ‘armed group’  (Koh, 2010) or ‘an organization’ (Obama, 2013). 
Common to these denominations is the ‘corporate’ character of the terrorists. This 
relates to what Fairclough labels the ‘interpersonal function’. The terrorists are framed 
as a corporate entity, arguably diminishing the individual character of the targets of 
drone strikes. On the contrary, ‘we are’ is being used when addressing who fights the 
terrorists, and ‘civilians’ or ‘innocents’ is used to describe the potential victims of 
terrorism. This is sensible in terms of strengthening the right intention, because it 
emphasizes the human character of the lives saved while simultaneously depriving these 
characteristics of the lives taken. John Brennan’s emphasis on the “twisted worldview 
offered by al-Qa’ida” (Brennan, 2011) supports the construct of Al Qaeda as a collective 
and distorted entity. In other words, when the Obama Administration frames members of 
Al Qaeda and associated forces as individuals collectively plotting against the United 
States, the terrorists take on the form of a corporate body. Arguably, it makes the 
individual death of such terrorists less of a human tragedy.  
 
The principle of right intention can be identified primarily in relation to the ‘murderous’ 
motives of Al Qaeda and its associated forces (Brennan, 2012). The Obama 
Administration claims that using lethal force against these malicious groupings save 
innocent lives in a broader picture, despite civilian casualties as a result of this 
confrontation. In this regard, two notions of truth are constructed. First, certitude that 
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non-action against terrorist networks would result in several more civilian deaths caused 
by terrorist acts, suggests that action is rightful. Second, the consolidated non-civilian 
characteristics of Al Qaeda and associated forces obviate an inclusion of these in death 
count evaluations. Thus, the construction of an unlawful, malicious ‘other’ permits 
lawful and ethically prudent confrontation with this entity. 
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The following section concerns how the Obama Administration legitimizes their use of 
drones by means of the principle of last resort. The Administration argues that action in 
other countries against terrorists posing a threat to the United States is only taken when 
the host country is unwilling or unable to act. In this manner, the U.S. emphasizes how 
they are needed to act as a last resort.  
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Generally, the Obama Administration has a minor focus on this principle. One can argue 
that it is because it is a standard procedure not to negotiate with terrorists (U.S. 
Department of State, 06.12.13), hence it is obvious to the Obama Administration that the 
use of drones in the war against Al Qaeda is a last resort. Additionally, Al Qaeda is a 
non-state actor and is thus arguably not subject to the same diplomatic attributes as state 
actors are. Diplomacy simply isn’t an option and they do not need to convince anyone or 
justify the lack of diplomacy. However, President Obama addresses the principle on a 
general notion: “So this is a just war – a war waged proportionally in last resort, and in 
self-defense” (Obama, 2013). He expresses a high degree of affinity to his statement. 
This can be seen by the modal verb is, which constructs the statement as an objective 
truth; something that cannot be put into question, as if it was a legal matter.  
 
Implicitly, other arguments present in the speeches are possible to associate with the last 
resort principle. These arguments regard other states’ incapability to manage terrorist 
residences in their own territories. Obama expresses it very clear, “We act against 
terrorists who pose a continuing and imminent threat to the American people, and when 
there are no other governments capable of effectively addressing the threat” (Obama, 
2013). This point is supported by other texts as well (Holder, 2012; Brennan, 2012). In 
all statements, it is argued that action is only taken when the host government does not 
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address the threat (Obama, 2013; Holder, 2012; Brennan, 2012). Hence, it adheres to the 
principle of last resort because it stresses that a threat exists which needs to be dealt 
with, and although the United States are not the first choice respondents to this threat, 
they become so because the primary actors are unable or unwilling to do so. The Obama 
Administration implies that they fundamentally observe the principle of sovereignty. 
However, when the host government is unable or unwilling to tackle this threat, the 
United States are obliged to act as an act of last resort. 
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This section demonstrates how the Obama Administration attempts to justify its drone 
use by constructing their counterterrorism efforts as a more narrow war against Al 
Qaeda. In this manner, drones are framed as a weapon of choice that enhances the 
United States’ chance of success. 
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The speech of John Brennan is essential in articulating the just war principle of 
reasonable chance of success. The speech addresses the ethics and efficacy of president 
Obama’s counterterrorism strategy including the use of drones. Throughout the speech 
there is a consistent focus on the possibility of defeating Al Qaeda. Brennan’s stance is 
quite obvious; success is possible and drones are a key instrument in this context. What 
is striking in Brennan’s articulation of the U.S. approach on terrorism is that he 
explicitly states they have stopped using the phrase ‘war on terror’. Instead he refers to 
the efforts against terrorism as a ‘conflict’, ‘fight’ or ‘war’ against Al Qaeda 
specifically: “We are at war. We are at war against a terrorist organization called al-
Qa’ida” (Brennan, 2012). Legal Adviser Harold Koh adheres to this focus on Al Qaeda 
by stating “[…] we continue to fight the perpetrators of 9/11: […] al-Qaeda” (Koh, 
2010). By narrowing the identity of the enemy threat to Al Qaeda, the Obama 
Administration dissociates itself from the rhetoric of the Bush Administration. This is 
also evident in a claim by President Obama, “Neither I, nor any President, can promise 
the total defeat of terror. […] But what we can do – what we must do – is dismantle 
networks that pose a direct danger to us” (Obama, 2013). This shift from the ‘war on 
terror’ towards a more tangible ‘war on Al Qaeda’ enables the Obama Administration to 
determine the possibility of success in a far more convincing manner. It appears more 
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realistically achievable to defeat a limited terror cell such as Al Qaeda, than to overcome 
and defeat terrorism all over the world. Brennan’s confident belief in defeating Al Qaeda 
appears in several conspicuous statements in his speech. The statement “[…] I believe 
this decade will be the one that sees its [Al Qaeda’s] demise” (Brennan, 2012), is a 
prime example of his conviction. In terms of transitivity, Brennan himself becomes an 
active agent when stating ‘I believe’, which makes the statement personal and reliant on 
the credibility of Brennan.  
 
Brennan refers to drones as a ‘counterterrorism tool’ and a ‘critical tool’ several times. 
In using the metaphor ‘tool’, Brennan signifies the meaning of a drone in a certain way 
and thereby constructs reality in a certain way (Fairclough, 1992:194). According to 
Fairclough, metaphors structure what people think and systems of knowledge and belief 
in a pervasive and fundamental way (ibid.). By articulating drones as ‘tools’, Brennan 
calls to mind the function of a tool. A tool is an item that solves a problem; hence the 
linguistic use of such implies a reasonable chance of success. When using this metaphor, 
Brennan constructs drones as troubleshooters, and thus affects the meaning of the word 
‘drone’. Just as a tool can help solve a problem, drones can help ‘solve’ the conflict with 
Al Qaeda. An alternative wording could be ‘a measure’ or an ‘instrument’. Such 
wordings would entail different perceptions of drones and influence the word meaning 
‘drone’ in a different way. In other words the metaphor ascribes distinct connotations to 
the word meaning of ‘drones’ and ‘drone use’. One can argue that the problem solving 
‘tool’ metaphor underlines Brennan’s belief in a reasonable chance of success in 
defeating Al Qaeda. Another feature of the tool metaphor is that it downplays the 
severity of drone use. Drones appear to be much more harmless when articulated as 
‘tools’ rather than the slightly more ferocious ‘killer machines’, hereby ascribing 
different connotations. Additionally, the ‘tool’ metaphor is present several times in 
Attorney General Holder’s speech on targeted strikes (Holder, 2012).  
 
Generally drones are framed as instruments that increase U.S. chance of success in 
defeating Al Qaeda. Brennan links the targeted strikes of drones to the principle of 
reasonable chance of success, “[…] with the help of targeted strikes we have turned al-
Qa’ida into a shadow of what it once was. They are on the road to destruction” 
(Brennan, 2012). He ascribes the use of drones to the success in fighting Al Qaeda. As 
with the former statement this also implies an active agent by saying ‘we have’. This is 
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probably intentional to acknowledge the Obama Administration’s successful efforts 
against Al Qaeda. The last sentence contains categorical modality because of the modal 
verb ‘are’. The future of Al Qaeda is unquestionable; they are incontrovertibly on the 
road to destruction. In other words, the discursive framing constructs it as an 
incontestable fact. The instance of categorical modality reflects and promotes the 
authority of both the statement and of John Brennan.  
 
General Counsel of the Department of Defense, Jeh Johnson, also refers to the principle 
of reasonable chance of success and the narrow focus on Al Qaeda by stating: “We have 
focused our efforts on Al Qaeda, and put that group on a path to defeat” and “[…] Al 
Qaeda senior leadership is today severely crippled and degraded”  (Johnson, 2012). As 
mentioned before the specific focus on Al Qaeda is a tendency in all the speeches. 
Johnson also explicitly distances himself from the former administration’s war on terror, 
which linguistically increases the likelihood of a successful war campaign, “It [the 
dispersal of Al Qaeda] should not be interpreted to mean that we believe we are in any 
‘Global War on Terror’, or we can use military force whenever we want” (Johnson, 
2012). The same point is evident in the speech of Obama “[…] we must define our effort 
not as boundless ‘global war on terror’, but rather as a series of persistent, targeted 
efforts to dismantle specific networks of violent extremists that threaten America” 
(Obama, 2013).  
 
As the above sections expose, there is a general tendency to articulate the principle of 
reasonable chance of success regarding the use of drones in the war against Al Qaeda. 
The Obama Administration appears highly consistent in their attempts to frame the 
drone program as something that increases their chances of success against Al Qaeda. 
Generally, they argue that drones increase the chance of success in defeating Al Qaeda 
and are thereby attempting to justify the use of drones in terms of the just war tradition. 
It is unclear to what extent the Obama Administration has changed its counterterrorism 
strategy, and this assessment is outside the research field of this study. But the change in 
articulation from war on terrorism to war against Al Qaeda constructs the conflict as one 
that is possible to win. This point is made clear by president Obama, when stating that, 
“[…] the core of al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan is on the path to defeat” 
(Obama, 2013). 
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The following section provides an investigation of the extent to which the Obama 
Administration legitimizes its use of drones by drawing on the principle of legitimate 
authority. As mentioned previously, the principle of legitimate authority encompasses 
that the decision to go to war has to be taken by duly constituted public authorities. In 
this regard, the Obama Administration makes reference to the AUMF, a bill 
emphasizing the very authority of the President to wage war against adversaries 
involved in the 9/11 attacks.  
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The United States is currently in an armed conflict with Al Qaeda as a result of 9/11. As 
a result of this, on September 18th 2001 Congress passed a law titled Authorization for 
Use of Military Force, granting the President of the United States the authority to use 
armed force against those whom he determined planned, authorized, committed or aided 
the 9/11 attacks (USGOP, 2001). In several speeches examined in this study, the 
mandate granted by the AUMF is being addressed.  
 
The Obama Administration puts a general emphasis on how the AUMF is still a viable 
authorization to this day. “Ten years later, the AUMF remains on the books, and it is 
still a viable authorization today” (Johnson, 2012) and “ […] Congress authorized the 
use of all necessary and appropriate force through the 2001 Authorization for Use of 
Military Force. These […] authorities continue to this day” (Koh, 2010) provide 
examples of this. This continuing authority is being cemented with categorical modality, 
the fact that it is still a viable authorization today. Simultaneously, it contains a passive 
agent inasmuch as the AUMF is a non-personal entity; it is not something that the 
Obama Administration argues and interprets to be continuously relevant. The Obama 
Administration are thus not ‘applying’ this authority, it is something that they are 
determined to comply with. The mandate provided by the AUMF maintains that warfare 
against non-state groupings within countries that the United States are not in a declared 
war with are indeed legitimate. Preserving an idea of the continuous relevance of the 
AUMF strengthens the legitimacy of these actions. Yet, in President Obama’s speech 
from May 2013, he does seem to soften up on the unwavering character of the AUMF.  
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“So I look forward to engaging Congress and the American people in efforts to refine, and 
ultimately repeal, the AUMF's mandate. And I will not sign laws designed to expand this 
mandate further. Our systematic effort to dismantle terrorist organizations must continue. 
But this war, like all wars, must end.”  
         (Obama, 2013) 
 
This quote is inevitably linked to the principle of reasonable chance of success. Thus, 
Obama statement implies that the Al Qaeda will be defeated, which will consequently 
call for a revision of the AUMF mandate in the future. In contrast to the statements 
made by Johnson and Koh, Obama hereby opens the AUMF up for reconsideration. 
President Obama becomes an active agent personally, because he undertakes the 
responsibility of evaluating the necessity of the AUMF parallel to the supposed demise 
of Al Qaeda.  
 
Although the ideational maintenance of the AUMF as a viable authorization strengthens 
the legitimacy of American drone use, President Obama emphasizes the contextual 
limitations to this mandate, thus raising doubt as to the role of rhetoric concerning the 
AUMF in the future. Yet to this day, the AUMF remains an important component in the 
articulate justification of American drone use, inasmuch as it constructs a legitimate 
authority for the U.S. president to intervene in countries with whom they are not 
officially in war.  
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The following section investigates how the Obama Administration refers to the 
discrimination principle when articulating drones, hereby claiming that the use of drones 
provides an unprecedented ability to discriminate between civilians and combatants. In 
this section, the study argues that the discrimination principle is highly central in the 
argumentation and efforts to justify the United States’ use of drones. 
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The discrimination principle is highly present in the speeches of the Obama 
Administration. Throughout the speeches the discrimination principle is directly 
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connected with drone technology as with the proportionality principle. Arguments rooted 
in the discrimination principle occur frequently and stress that the emergence of drone 
technology enables the U.S. military to operate significantly more precise and 
discriminate and thereby avoid civilian casualties. Brennan elaborates on the precision 
enabled by drones: 
 
Yet they [targeted strikes by drones] are also a wise choice because they dramatically 
reduce the danger to innocent civilians, especially considered against massive ordnance 
that can cause injury and death far beyond its intended target. In addition, compared 
against other options, a pilot operating this aircraft remotely – with the benefit of 
technology and with the safety of distance – might actually have a clearer picture of the 
target and its surroundings, including the presence of innocent civilians. It’s this surgical 
precision – the ability, with laser-like focus, to eliminate the cancerous tumor called an 
al-Qa’ida terrorist while limiting damage to the tissue around it – that makes this 
counterterrorism tool so essential. 
(Brennan, 2012) 
 
The above quotation comprises the essence of the discrimination principle, and 
champions the view that drones fully comply with the principle; they reduce the danger 
to innocent civilians. Different rhetorical instruments strengthen the message of the 
statement. First of all there is an antagonism between drones and the loose definition 
‘massive ordnance’. This definition can in principle contain any military capability.  
Arguably, this downplays the destructiveness of drones because they are presented in 
opposition to any kind of ‘massive’ military capability. Thereby drones are constructed 
as a discriminate military capability that is not ‘massive’, and that reduces civilian 
casualties opposite to ‘massive’ ordnance, “that can cause injury and death far beyond 
the intended target”. Additionally, the military operations of the United States become 
more discriminating because drone technology might enable a ‘clearer picture of the 
target’ and possible ‘innocent civilians’.  However, the affinity to this claim is toned 
down by the presence of the hedge ‘might’, which indicates that it is not always the case. 
 
The latter part of the statement functions as a metaphor, which Fairclough sees as 
persuasive, insofar as it constructs a particular figurative truth about drones (Fairclough, 
1992:194). Brennan presents drones in a medical terminology and juxtaposes the 
precision of drones with ‘surgical precision’ and a ‘laser-like focus’. This juxtaposition 
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contributes in the construction of drones as discriminate. Moreover, Brennan equates an 
Al Qaeda terrorist with a cancerous tumor, calling to mind a severe disease, thus 
stressing the negative character of an Al Qaeda terrorist. This medical set up emphasizes 
that drones help ‘cure’ the ‘disease’ Al Qaeda – and this is done in a discriminate way 
that limits the ‘damage to the tissue around it’.  Finally, Brennan claims that it is the 
surgical precision of drones that makes them an essential counterterrorism ‘tool,’ using 
the tool metaphor once more. The ‘tool’ metaphor implies that drones ‘solve’ different 
problems as discussed in section 3.4 on reasonable chance of success. Another utterance 
that illustrates the substantial focus on the discrimination principle also emphasizes that 
increasing possibilities to operate discriminate can be ascribed to drones. 
 
“The unprecedented advances we have made in technology provide us greater proximity to 
targets for a longer period of time, and as a result allow us to better understand what is 
happening in real time on the ground in ways that were previously impossible. We can be 
much more discriminating and we can make more informed judgments about factors that 
might contribute to collateral damage.”        (Brennan, 2012) 
The above statements illustrate that the discrimination principle is explicitly linked with 
drone technology; this is representative for the rest of the speeches as the following 
demonstrates. 
 
Holder also addresses the discriminate character of drones and stresses that drone 
technology enables the United States to minimize civilian casualties, “In fact, the use of 
advanced weapons [among these: drones] may help to ensure that the best intelligence 
is available for planning and carrying out operations, and that the risk of civilian 
casualties can be minimized or avoided altogether.” (Holder, 2012). The two above 
statements acknowledge that civilian casualties may occur by claiming that drones 
‘minimize’ or ‘reduce’ the likelihood of civilian casualties. Obama demands a bit more 
stating that “[…] there must be a near-certainty that no civilians will be killed or 
injured” (Obama, 2013). The high affinity to the statement and the expression that ‘no’ 
civilian must be killed or injured arguably makes this claim a bit more intense and 
straightforward than the former quotes. Along with the rest of Obama the 
Administration, Koh also stresses the importance of the discrimination principle and 
assures that the U.S. strikes are discriminate which, “requires that attacks be limited to 
military objectives and that civilians or civilian objects shall not be the object of the 
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attack” (Koh, 2010). Koh further emphasizes the discriminatory possibilities enabled by 
drones; “indeed targeting particular individuals serves to narrow the focus when force 
is employed and to avoid broader harm to civilians and civilian objects.” (Koh, 2010). 
Another vital statement regarding drones’ compliance with  the discrimination principle, 
is presented by Brennan: 
 
“Targeted strikes conform to the principle of distinction13 — the idea that only military 
objectives may be intentionally targeted and that civilians are protected from being 
intentionally targeted. With the unprecedented ability of remotely piloted aircraft to 
precisely target a military objective while minimizing collateral damage, one could argue 
that never before has there been a weapon that allows us to distinguish more effectively 
between an al Qa'ida terrorist and innocent civilians.”  
(Brennan, 2012) 
 
What is notable in this quotation is that Brennan directly ascribes the opportunity to 
operate with great discrimination to remotely piloted aircraft. He thus articulates it as an 
incontestable fact that it is the ‘unprecedented’ precision of drones that minimize 
collateral damage. Brennan also makes it clear that the targeted strikes of drones 
‘conform’ to the principle of distinction. He constructs it as evident because of the 
categorical modality in the sentence. In the latter part of the quotation Brennan claims 
that, “one could argue that never before has there been a weapon that allow us to 
distinguish more effectively”.  The phrase ‘could argue’ tones down the affinity to the 
statement a bit; this is arguably done because it is difficult to judge the effectiveness of 
different types of military equipment.  The last part of the sentence contains an active 
agent in the presence of ‘us’, implying that that it is the efforts of the Obama 
Administration that allows for more discriminate operations. 
 
Generally, the specific wording of drones varies a lot throughout the texts. Brennan 
seems to be the one that is most direct when repeatedly referring to drones as ‘remotely 
piloted aircraft’. Other wordings of are ‘unmanned aerial vehicle’ (Brennan, 2012; Koh, 
2010), ‘Drone’ (Obama, 2013; Brennan, 2012), ‘counterterrorism tool’ and ‘critical tool’ 
(Brennan, 2012), ‘tool’ (Brennan, 2012; Holder, 2012), ‘Advanced weapons systems’ 
(Koh, 2010),  ‘new technology’ (Obama, 2013), ‘Weapon’ (Brennan, 2012), !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"9!Brennan and the Obama Administration use the principle of distinction instead of the principle of 
discrimination, but it refers to the same principle of the just war tradition.!
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‘technologically advanced weapons (systems)’ (Holder, 2012; Brennan 2012; Johnson, 
2012; Koh, 2010), ‘Advanced weapons’ (Holder, 2012), ‘advanced technology’ 
(Brennan, 2012) and ‘pilotless aircraft’ (Koh, 2010). Common for these wordings are 
that they all refer to word ‘drone’. Each wording entails different connotations and 
perceptions about armed drones and thereby constructs the understanding of ‘drone’ 
differently. In other words, there is a great difference between a ‘weapon’, ‘tool’ or 
‘technology’. One could argue that the Obama Administration through various 
articulations of drones attempts to remove the focus from drones as they are presented in 
the media, and that ‘drone’ has become a dirty word.14 
  
Holder further addresses the discrimination principle. He states that “The principle of 
distinction requires that only lawful targets – such as combatants, civilians directly 
participating in hostilities, and military objectives – may be targeted intentionally.” 
(Holder, 2012), and drones are being framed as an instrument that meet these critera 
(ibid.). In the statement “civilians directly participating in hostilities” is presented as 
lawful targets. This is opposed to the articulation of ‘civilians’ in other speeches where 
they are articulated as ‘innocent civilians’. This constructs divergent notions of 
‘civilians’. Traditionally, there has been a distinction between designated combatants 
and civilians in warfare (Holsti, 2004:281). Civilians were outside the ambit of war 
(ibid.). In the speeches though, it seems like civilians are constructed as a group 
containing both innocents and combatants, some as “directly participating in hostilities” 
(Holder, 2012) and some as ‘innocent civilians’ (Brennan, 2012). Civilians have entered 
the ambit of war. This blurs the traditional distinction between combatants and civilians 
and makes the identification of the enemy difficult, which is emphasized by Brennan, 
“After all, al-Qa’ida does not follow a traditional command structure, wear uniforms, 
carry its arms openly, or mass its troops at the borders of the nations it attacks.”  
(Brennan, 2012:7). The Obama Administration argues that this difficulty is countered by 
the use of drones, which enables an unprecedented ability to discriminate between 
enemy and friend, as illustrated in the above section. In sum, the principle of 
discrimination is highly central in the argumentation of the Obama Administration, and 
the arguments appear strong and are substantiated by the discrimination principle. The 
Obama Administration constructs drones in such a way that it is the existence of drones !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"=!^/$&+N2/$!_!T+$C7'2/!`-H"9Q8a!75N/!5!4'+$%!%;5%!(&'$/2!5&/!'1%/$!6/+$C!1&57/(!52!M750+*+')2!F/54'$2M!+$!%;/!7/(+5,!!
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that enables them to operate discriminate; it is the drones that minimize and reduce the 
likelihood of civilian casualties. 
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This section provides an examination of how the Obama Administration justifies its 
drone program by means of the proportionality principle. As mentioned in section 2.1 on 
the just war tradition, it is important to emphasize that the proportionality principle is 
present both in jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Although the two dimensions are 
traditionally thought independent, the distinction certainly becomes blurred in the 
speeches. The Obama Administration does not tell apart whether drone use is an act of 
initiating a conflict or a military capability used during a conflict. In the forthcoming 
section it is not possible to draw a clear division between the jus ad bellum and the jus in 
bello. 
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The proportionality principle is pivotal in the Obama Administration’s legitimization of 
drone use. The core argumentation concerns the benefits of drone technology, which 
enables the U.S. to operate with a high degree of precision. The Obama Administration 
claims that drones increase the military advantage and that the advantages made possible 
by drones outweigh the damages of the actions. The arguments closely linked to the 
proportionality principle stands clear and are often mentioned explicitly to emphasize 
the righteousness of drone use. Following statement illustrates this point: 
 
“Targeted strikes conform to the principle of proportionality – the notion that the 
anticipated collateral damage of an action cannot be excessive in relation to the 
anticipated military advantage. By targeting an individual terrorist or small numbers 
of terrorists with ordnance that can be adapted to avoid harming others in the 
immediate vicinity, it is hard to imagine a tool that can better minimize the risk to 
civilians than remotely piloted aircraft.” 
(Brennan, 2012) 
 
Brennan’s wording is noteworthy. In the above statement the general wording downplays 
the severity of targeted strikes. Instead of ‘action’ Brennan could use ‘attack’, and 
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instead of using ‘ordnance’ he could have used ‘predator missiles’.  It is possible to claim 
that Brennan’s choice of words distances the audience from the reality of the battlefield 
and that his statement hereby becomes more digestible to the public. It is also notable 
that Brennan uses the ‘tool’ metaphor again. In case of transitivity, there is a passive 
agent in the statement, in fact it is omitted. Combined with a high degree of modality, 
this makes the statement factual. The passive agent and the high degree of affinity to the 
statement construct the claim as an incontestable fact; it is not just something the Obama 
Administrations believes, it is an undisputable fact.  
 
It is also worth noticing that Brennan addresses the effort to reduce civilian casualties, 
made possible by the use of drones. Preventing more evil than one causes is central to the 
principles of proportionality and right intention. As emphasized earlier, civilian 
casualties attained from an action must not exceed the casualties of non-action. The focus 
on civilians connects the principle of proportionality to the principle of discrimination. 
This is also a tendency in the speeches. Arguments rooted in the proportionality principle 
are often succeeded by arguments rooted in the discrimination principle and vice versa. 
Occasionally they are merged, yet in this study they are separated for analytical reasons. 
Hence, aspects of the discrimination principle are also present in statements regarding 
proportionality, which is also the case in the above statement. 
  
The Obama Administration consistently refer to the proportionality principle by stating 
that the United States always “use all necessary and appropriate force” (Brennan, 2012) 
and that the United States defend themselves through “the appropriate and lawful use of 
lethal force” (Holder, 2012).  The phrase: “the use of appropriate force against Al 
Qaeda”, is a general articulation of the proportionality principle. Usually it is not more 
elaborate than the former example illustrates. One can argue that it is an indication of a 
general consensus on the proportionality of drone use. However, there are several 
instances where the proportionality principle is more elaborate in order to strengthen the 
justification of drone use. As an example Brennan states that “We also carefully consider 
the costs of inaction and whether a decision not to carry out a strike could allow a 
terrorist attack to proceed and potentially kill scores of innocents” (Brennan, 2012). This 
claim is highly consistent with the principle of proportionality. It emphasizes that drone 
use comply with the principle of proportionality to a high extent.  
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It is highly relevant to pay attention to the relation between transitivity in the speeches. 
The above quotation contains an active agent whereas the former contained a passive 
agent. There is a high degree of inconsistency regarding transitivity in general. It seems 
like the Obama Administration oscillates between active and passive agent in relation to 
strengthen the argumentation the most. The active agent in the above statement makes 
the Obama Administration appear merciful and reverential, because of expressions such 
as ‘we carefully consider’ linked with ‘potentially kill of innocents’. It is the Obama 
Administration as individuals, who ensure that as few civilians as possible are exposed to 
risk. On the contrary, when it concerns the legality of drone use the statements are with 
passive agents. One could argue that the Obama Administration does not need to 
personally vouch for the legality because it is framed as an incontestable fact. It is not 
something ‘we’ [the Obama Administration] ‘think’, ‘claim’ or ‘believe’, hence a passive 
agent. 
 
As previously mentioned, the proportionality principle stresses that a military action must 
outweigh its damages. Following extract from the white paper encapsulates this point, “it 
would not be consistent with those principles [Law of war principles, including 
proportionality] to continue an operation if anticipated civilian casualties would be 
excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage” (White Paper, 2013). This 
announcement indicates that the Obama Administration attach great importance to the 
proportionality principle. What is notable in this announcement is that ‘civilian 
casualties’ is measureable whereas ‘anticipated military advantage’ is a matter of 
interpretation, making the process of evaluating proportionality a highly contextual 
matter. Thus, it is up to the Obama Administration to define what a military advantage is. 
What the Obama Administration defines as a military advantage is not necessarily equal 
to how others would define it, which make critiques of U.S. more difficult when their 
argumentation is rooted in the principle of proportionality.  
 
Along with his administration, President Obama stresses that the use of drones is highly 
proportionate. He claims that drones facilitate the U.S. to fight Al Qaeda effectively and 
by doing so the civilian casualties will decrease, “Remember that the terrorists we are 
after target civilians, and the death toll from their acts of terrorism against Muslims 
dwarfs any estimate of civilian casualties from drone strikes” (Obama, 2013). In this 
claim Obama addresses the core point of the proportionality principle; that a war must 
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first aim at preventing more evil than it causes, especially that civilian casualties attained 
from an action should not exceed the casualties of non-action. The active agent in the 
sentence arguably constructs a situation where it is the Obama Administration that 
personally pursues the terrorists, and the effort of preventing civilian casualties can thus 
be ascribed to their use of drones. 
 
To recapitulate, the above section has shown that the Obama Administration emphasizes 
the proportionality principle in order to justify the use of drones. The argumentation that 
the use of drones increases the opportunity to act proportionate is pivotal and appears 
frequently in the speeches. Thus, the use of drones is legitimized according to the Obama 
Administration through adherence to the proportionality principle. By consistently 
focusing on the proportionality of drone use, the Obama Administration constructs a 
system of knowledge and belief in which the use of drones is proportionate; drones 
certainly prevent more evil that it causes.  
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This section directs its attention towards the principle of military necessity. It is 
illustrated how the Obama Administration’s rhetorical focus on ‘targeted strikes’ rather 
than ‘signature strikes’ makes for a stronger compliance to the principle of military 
necessity. By emphasizing that targets are chosen on the basis of a careful assessment of 
military value, the Obama Administration frame targeted strikes as in full compliance 
with the principle of military necessity.  
 
This principle stresses that an attack or action must be intended to help in the military 
defeat of the enemy; it must be an attack on a military objective. Whereas the principle 
of discrimination emphasizes how only military combatants and facilities are legitimate 
targets of warfare, the principle of military necessity complements this by stressing how 
such targets must contribute to an overall military objective. In this respect, it is not 
sufficient to legitimize strikes solely on the grounds that the targets are combatants – 
their termination must have military value. The distinction between ‘targeted strikes’ 
and ‘signature strikes’ becomes important in this regard. The Obama Administration 
exclusively address ‘targeted strikes’, while the much more controversial ‘signature 
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strikes’ are left out15. The evaluation of military value is a central element in targeted 
strikes, whereas it is much more uncertain in the case of signature strikes. Hence, the 
rhetorical maintenance of targeted strikes as the center of attention advances the 
administrations claim of adhering to the principle of military necessity.  
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In order for targeted strikes to adhere to the principle of military necessity, targets of 
military force need to hold military value. John Brennan addresses this issue on a 
general notion that: “The principle of necessity requires that the target have definite 
military value” (Brennan, 2012), implying that lethal force carried out by drones adhere 
to this principle. In this study’s entire empirical field, articulations concerning drone use 
address ‘targeted strikes’ and not ‘signature strikes’, showing an extensive degree of 
intertextuality. Fairclough highlights that: “Textual analysis […] needs to attend to what 
is significantly not ‘there’ as well as what is ‘there’ – to significant absences” 
(Fairclough, 2010:487). In this regard, the complete absence of the denomination 
‘signature strikes’ is indeed significant, because it is the target of much debate related to 
drone use.  
 
Signature strikes are based on a pre-identified ‘signature’ of military activity and are 
highly controversial because of their arguably inadequate ability to evaluate the military 
value of targets (Greenfield, 2010). On the contrary, targeted strikes are subject to the 
following process according to Brennan: 
 
“If our counterterrorism professionals assess, for example, that a suspected member of 
al-Qaida poses such a threat to the United States to warrant lethal action, they may raise 
that individual’s name for consideration. The proposal will go through a careful review 
and as appropriate will be evaluated by the very senior officials in our government for a 
decision”  
(Brennan, 2012) 
 
Hereby he emphasizes how being an Al Qaeda member is not sufficient for the United 
States to use lethal force against this individual. Rather, a careful evaluation of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"V!#%!2;')0(!6/!$'%/(!%;5%!%;/&/!+2!7)*;!)$*/&%5+$%K!%'!%;/!5*%)50!/@%/$%!'1!%;/!)2/!'1!2+C$5%)&/!2%&+N/2,!"
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military value of a given target is included into lethal decisions. He uses a very low 
degree of modality when explaining how “they may raise that individual’s name for 
consideration”. Instead, he places this careful consideration under the responsibility of 
‘counterterrorism professionals’ and ‘the very senior officials’, thereby subscribing great 
expertise to this process. The statement contains active agents, and targeted strikes are 
thus ideationally constructed to be as righteous as possible. In contrast to this assessment 
process stands the occurrence of ‘signature strikes’. It appears difficult to present 
indisputable evidence that the killing of a given target is an act of military value, when 
this evidence is based on the appearance and action of the target at a given moment. 
Therefore, articulating drone use solely in relation to targeted strikes arguably makes 
adherence to the principle of military necessity a lot easier.  
 
As mentioned previously, targeting evaluations are subject to much secrecy (Lubold & 
Harris, 2013). Along with the previous presentation of the chain-of-command in relation 
to targeted strikes, Brennan adds a few more general notions to this process:  
 
“[…] when considering lethal force we ask ourselves whether the individual poses a 
significant threat to U.S. interests. […] We do not engage in legal action in order to 
eliminate every single member of al-Qaida in the world.”  
(Brennan, 2012)  
 
Embedded in the above statement is an emphasis on how it would be fundamentally in 
jurisprudent accordance for the United States to go after every single member of Al 
Qaeda. Targeting procedures, as elaborated in the previous statement, do however allow 
for a more specific distinction between targets of military value and targets of non-
military value. The most distinctive part about the above quotation is how it seeks to 
ascribe a high extent of ethical liability to the Obama Administration. There is an active 
agent in the sentence, when it is stressed how ‘we ask ourselves’ and ‘we do not engage’ 
in rash lethal decisions. This constructs an notion that the Obama Administration is an 
upright authority exercising sound judgment on imperative lethal decisions. ‘When 
considering’ and ‘we ask ourselves whether’ downplays the affinity attached to the 
lethal action, thereby emphasizing the large amount of hesitation and due consideration 
prior to using such force. The subsequent ‘We do not engage’ stresses with categorical 
modality how lethal force is carefully evaluated, and simultaneously dissociates 
American drone use from ‘elimination’. Hence, the evaluation of military necessity 
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becomes a responsibility that the Obama Administration personally undertakes, 
wherefore the guiding principles to targeting selection in the end relies on the 
administration. 
 
Maintaining ‘targeted strikes’ as the articulate center of attention dismisses problems of 
assessing military value in relation to signature strikes. Evidently, the Obama 
Administration refrains from addressing ‘signature strikes’, perhaps because of their 
difficulties in justifying the military value. The evaluation of military necessity in 
targeted strikes is ascribed to counterterrorism professionals, thus emphasizing the high 
degree of prudence involved in such a process. The Obama Administration upholds that 
targeted strikes are equated to the overall purpose and use of drone strikes. Accordingly, 
they are executed with a great extent of proficiency, thus emphasizing a high compliance 
with the principle of military necessity.  
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Whereas the previous sections carried out a textual analysis focusing on the linguistics 
of specific texts, this section discusses the general trends within the discursive practice, 
i.e. the common characteristics of the full body of texts within the order of discourse. 
Analysis of the discursive practice of the issue at hand, i.e. the Obama Administrations 
articulation of drones, allows for a broader assessment of the discursive tendencies 
uncovered in the textual analysis. The focus is hereby to assess to what extent the 
Obama Administration legitimizes its use of drones by drawing on key elements of the 
just war tradition. Thus, this section evaluates the general inclinations of the previous 
textual analysis in relation to the thesis of this study. In doing so, it is argued that the 
Obama Administration legitimizes the U.S. drone program by constructing a distinct 
ideational frame of understanding rooted in the just war tradition, hereby drawing on the 
core elements of jus ad bellum and jus in bello to a high extent. The concepts of 
intertextuality, interdiscursivity and recontextualization will be discussed in closing. In 
conclusion, it is argued that the Obama Administration not only reproduces the notions 
of the just war tradition when legitimizing U.S. drone use; they recontextualize the 
tradition by applying a conventional framework of just warfare to a proclaimed ‘new’ 
and ‘unconventional’ conflict setting, thus ascribing novel meanings to the tradition. 
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The principles of the just war tradition are significantly present in the Obama 
Administration’s articulations of the drone program. They are essential components in 
constructing a threat, in justifying a response!to this threat and the specific manner in 
which this response is formulated, i.e. drone use and targeted strikes. In other words, 
principles of both jus ad bellum and jus in bello provide a discursive foundation for the 
justification of the U.S. drone program. 
 
Initially, the construction of an ‘imminent’ and ‘continuous’ threat implies that action 
taken against this threat is justified as a just cause. Simultaneously, the framing of Al 
Qaeda as a murderous entity strengthens the notion that action is rightfully intended. 
Articulations concerning these principles do not directly justify the emergence of drones, 
but constructs the very bedrock for American engagement in this conflict. In other 
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words, the framing of the threat suggests that U.S. action adhere to the principles of just 
cause and right intention. As mentioned previously, discourses contribute to the 
construction of social identities, social relations and systems of knowledge and beliefs 
(Fairclough, 1992:64). In Fairclough’s terms, the framing of the enemy threat thus 
constructs a distinct interpersonal relationship between the U.S. and its proclaimed 
adversaries which legitimizes U.S. use of lethal force. The construction of a ‘murderous’ 
and ‘twisted’ identity of the Al Qaeda on the one hand (see Brennan, 2011 & Brennan, 
2012), and the construction of a ‘rightfully intended’ U.S. Self on the other thus 
provides justification for the use of armed force and targeted strikes. 
 
Additionally, the threat is constructed as one that demands particular measures capable 
of coping with this imminent and spatially distorted threat. The construction of an 
‘imminent’ threat is vital to Obama Administrations justification of drone use, because it 
is argued that drones meet exactly the needs an ‘imminent’ threat entails.  According to 
the Obama Administration, drones comply with the principles of proportionality and 
discrimination to an unprecedented extent, making them the perfect ‘tool’ for countering 
such threats. The arguments concerning just cause, right intention, proportionality and 
discrimination all encompass a high degree of modality – they are articulated with an 
almost fact-like status. With Fairclough’s terminology, the Obama Administration 
hereby constructs an ideational system of truth in which it is an indisputable fact that 
drones are both rightful and appropriate. 
 
The principles of last resort and legitimate authority are less frequent in the Obama 
Administration’s line of argument. However, they are still important components in the 
justification of drone use and the proclaimed war against Al Qaeda in general. The 
Obama Administration thus champions that the use of drones and targeted strikes are in 
accordance with the principle of last resort. They put forth the claim that drone strikes 
are only carried out in countries with whom the U.S. has not declared war if the host 
country is unable or unwilling to act itself. Furthermore, the framing of a legitimate 
authority is rooted in the constitutional authority of the U.S. president to wage war 
against adversaries who pose a threat towards the American people. In this context, the 
Obama Administration draw on the principles of the AUMF as a signifier of legitimate 
domestic authority inasmuch as it grants the President of the United States the authority 
to target terrorists abroad.  
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The discursive framing of U.S. chances of success in defeating Al Qaeda contributes 
further to the legitimization of the drone program. Thus, the Administration maintains 
that the war on Al Qaeda can be won. In doing so, the Obama Administration arguably 
distances itself from the ‘War on terror’-discourse of the former administration, 
emphasizing their high chance of success when focusing their efforts solely on the 
terrorist network of Al Qaeda. Thus, the Obama Administration hereby constructs their 
counterterrorism efforts against Al Qaeda as a war that can be won; hereby propagating 
their belief in a reasonable chance of success. 
 
Drones are framed as highly effective in this endeavor, and thus become linked to the 
possibility of success. Specifically, the Obama Administration champions the view that 
the very competences of drones enhance the ability to successfully discriminate, assess 
military value and strike proportionately. It is claimed that the technological advantages 
posed by drones mark for more precise targeting, thus increasing the act of 
discrimination. Additionally, drones are being constructed as instruments that increase 
military accuracy, allowing for better compliance to the principle of proportionality by 
minimizing collateral damage. In this manner, arguments rooted in the principles of 
discrimination and proportionality are discursively linked to the ‘inherent’ advantages of 
drones. 
 
On a general notion, the rhetoric maintenance of targeted strikes rather than ‘signature 
strikes’ is crucial in adhering to just war principles. As mentioned initially, the Obama 
Administration substantiates its arguments on a wide range of topics by incorporating 
just war principles. In particular instances, the arguments relate directly to drone use, in 
others they justify the more general basis of action in which drones are merely one 
aspect. The Administration integrates elements of just cause, right intention, last resort, 
reasonable chance of success and legitimate authority in justifying the overall basis of 
action. Moreover, the framing of these characteristics constructs a necessity for certain 
measures. It is argued that the competences of drones meet these demands while 
simultaneously entailing an enhancement to principles of discrimination, proportionality 
and military necessity.  
 
! V=!
In sum, the Obama Administration hereby incorporates all principles of the just war 
tradition when legitimizing the use of drones. Thus, all speeches are saturated with just 
war references that are explicitly and implicitly linked the U.S. drone program and the 
efforts to defeat the ‘imminent’ threat of Al Qaeda and their affiliates. From 
Fairclough’s perspective it is thus possible to argue that the prevailing discursive 
framing of the U.S. drone program constructs a distinct system of knowledge and belief, 
in which U.S. foreign intervention is in complete accordance with the principles of the 
just war tradition. As Fairclough points out, discourse ascribe meaning to the world, its 
processes, entities and relations (Fairclough, 1992:64). In this sense, the foreign policy 
discourse of the Obama Administration should not merely be seen as representations of 
the world and its processes. The speeches of the Obama Administration ascribe distinct 
meanings to drones, drone use and the legitimacy of U.S. foreign policy that collectively 
constitute a particular system of knowledge and belief. 
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The previous section was preoccupied with summing up the general tendencies of the 
discursive practice. This section examines the extent of intertextuality between the 
different texts used in this study in order to conclusively assess to what extent it is 
possible to speak of a common drone discourse within the speeches. It is argued that 
there is a very high degree of intertextuality between the texts because of a consistent 
similar argumentation, references to the just war tradition and linguistic instruments; and 
thus, the speeches can be said to embody a common discourse on U.S. drone use.  
 
As Fairclough states, “Intertextuality is basically the property of texts have of being full 
of snatches of other texts, which may be explicitly demarcated or merged in and which 
the text may assimilate, contradict, ironically echo, and so forth.” (Fairclough, 
1992:84). Generally there is a high degree of intertextuality between the speeches and 
the White Paper. Intertextuality is obvious in the case of the just war tradition. In the 
attempt to legitimize the use of drones, the Obama Administration substantiates their 
arguments in different principles of the just war tradition in similar manners. As the 
previous analysis illustrated there are plenty of examples where the different texts use 
the same arguments, wordings, metaphors and expressions, which entail that the 
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argumentation of the speeches come across highly homogeneous. The following 
illustrates different examples of intertextuality. 
 
In some cases even large parts of sentences are reused, as with this claim made by Koh 
in 2010, “Indeed, using such advanced technologies can ensure both that the best 
intelligence is available for planning operations, and that civilian casualties are 
minimized in carrying out such operations” (Koh, 2010), is reused by Holder in 2012, 
“In fact, the use of advanced weapons may help to ensure that the best intelligence is 
available for planning and carrying out operations, and that the risk of civilian 
casualties can be minimized or avoided altogether.” (Holder, 2012).  
These two statements are almost identical and there is a high degree of intertextuality, 
but generally it is smaller parts or arguments of the texts that are being reused 
repeatedly. As an example, all the texts address the principle of discrimination, 
illustrating a high degree of intertextuality; “We can be much more discriminating”, 
(Brennan, 2012), “The principle of distinction requires […]” (Holder, 2012), “We must 
apply, and we have applied, […] core principles of distinction” (Johnson, 2012), 
“civilians or civilian objects shall not be the object of the attack.” (Koh, 2010), “there 
must be a near-certainty that no civillians will be killed or injured” (Obama, 2013), 
“[drones] sufficiently reduce the probabilities of civilian casualties” (White Paper, 
2013). Another example of the high degree of intertextuality is that each text addresses 
the just cause principle in order to strengthen the justification of the use of drones 
(White Paper, 2013; Obama, 2013; Brennan, 2011;2012; Johnson, 2012; Holder, 2012; 
Koh, 2010). 
There are also instances of manifest intertextuality between the speeches, where one 
speech overtly draws upon another speech. An example is when Brennan draws upon the 
speech of Koh, “These speeches build on a lecture two years ago by Harold Koh” 
(Brennan, 2012) or when Johnson draws upon the exact same speech,  
“As Harold stated two years ago […]” (Johnson, 2012). 
The preceding examples have illustrated a high degree of intertextuality between the 
texts. In the case of the speeches, different parts from each speech are merged or 
reaccentuated in other speeches. This indicates that they use the same sorts of 
argumentation and that their arguments are not reworked or contradicted in order to 
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present new meanings. This entails that the speeches collectively occur as homogenous; 
with consistent arguments and the Obama Administration appears as a unity. 
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The previous section underlined how the empirical field of research is characterized by a 
high degree of intertextuality. Thus, the speeches come across as a homogeneous body 
of texts that converge around the same line of reasoning, using the same metaphors, 
wording etc. when legitimizing U.S. drone use. In this context, the analytical focus has 
been solely on the use of the just war principles in relation to the U.S. drone program. 
Conversely, the main purpose of this section is to briefly illustrate that the Obama 
Administration does not exclusively legitimize its use of drones by drawing on the just 
war concepts; the speeches additionally legitimize the use of drones through parallel 
lines of reasoning rooted in e.g. historic precedent and domestic legislative principles.  
 
The term interdiscursivity underlines that bodies of text are “constituted by 
combinations of diverse genres and discourses” (Fairclough, 2010:95). Due to the thesis 
of the study, the analysis has been exclusively preoccupied with what one might call a 
just war discourse in relation to U.S. drone use. The Obama Administration arguably 
also draws upon a series of other discourses that have not been elaborated on in the 
analysis, including arguments of historic precedent not necessarily linked to the just war 
tradition. The body of texts that constitute the empirical research field of this study is 
hereby inherently interdiscursive.  
 
The notion of historic precedent can be understood as a supplementary way of 
legitimizing U.S. drone use. Several of the speeches hereby make use of historic 
analogies in order to legitimize current actions (Holder, 2012; Koh, 2012; Brennan, 
2012). In relation to targeting threats, Attorney General Holder states that “Not only is 
this the right thing to do – history has shown that it is also the most effective approach 
we can take in combating those who seek to do us harm” (Holder, 2012). In this case, 
Holder’s statement constructs a parallel line of reasoning alongside the just war rhetoric, 
emphasizing the historic precedent of the effectiveness of such actions.  
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This tendency is also apparent within Jeh Johnson’s speech, in which he stresses that the 
U.S. also apply principles of ‘historic precedent’ as well as ‘traditional principles of 
statutory construction’ when assessing current foreign policy actions (Johnson, 2012). 
Johnson’s statement about principles of statutory construction can be seen as another 
way of discursively defending U.S. drone use with reference to domestic legislation. As 
mentioned in the analytical section concerned with the framing of a legitimate authority, 
the mandate given by the AUMF is one example. Moreover, U.S. drone use is also 
legitimized with reference to the Constitution. Holder e.g. states: 
 
“But just as surely as we are a nation at war, we also are a nation of laws and values. Even 
when under attack, our actions must always be grounded on the bedrock of the Constitution 
– and must always be consistent with statutes, court precedent, the rule of law and our 
founding ideals.”              (Holder, 2012) 
 
Thus, the legitimacy of the U.S. drone program is not exclusively legitimized with 
reference to the just war tradition. Legitimization is also grounded in principles of 
historic precedent as well as domestic legislative principles. With Fairclough’s terms, 
U.S. foreign policy action is thus legitimized through combinations of diverse 
discourses, in which the just war tradition nevertheless is most prominent. Conclusively, 
it is hereby necessary to emphasize that while the texts arguably embody some degree of 
interdiscursivity, statements concerned with principles of historic precedent and 
domestic legislation are subordinate to the magnitude of just war references. Thus, the 
Obama Administration predominantly legitimizes its use of drones by discursively 
framing U.S. actions in accordance with the just war principles. 
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The previous analytical sections demonstrated to what extent the Obama administration 
legitimizes its use of drones through the principles of the just war tradition. Thus, all 
speeches converge around the concepts of just cause, proportionality, military necessity 
etc. when defending U.S. use of armed drones and targeted strikes. In doing so, the 
Obama Administration not only reproduces the notions of the just war tradition; it 
arguably also recontextualizes the concept by applying it to a “conflict against an 
unconventional enemy such as al Qaeda” (Johnson, 2012). The forthcoming section 
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seeks to highlight this by arguing that the drone discourse of the Obama Administration 
apply the tradition to a novel context by referring to the tradition in relation to the 
asymmetrical and trans-boundary conflict of the war against Al Qaeda.  
 
As mentioned in the theoretical section of the just war tradition, the concept of just 
warfare and the legal framework of International Humanitarian Law were developed in 
the context of interstate conflicts (Brunstetter & Braun, 2000:352; Rengger, 2002:359). 
Consequently, one might argue that the principles of the tradition, which are 
incorporated in IHL, fails to adequately encompass the spatial character of contemporary 
armed engagements with non-state actors. Legal scholar Adam Pearlman emphasizes 
this view by arguing that the “unprecedented mobility and adaptability [of the enemy we 
face] were not considered when formulating the key facets of international law.” and 
thus, the justness of contemporary conflicts “cannot be judged by traditional principles 
that [were] developed in the context of state-to-state engagements” (Pearlman, 2010, in 
Brunstetter & Braun 2000:352).  
 
From this perspective, one may argue that the guiding principles of the just war tradition 
are inadequate when assessing contemporary conflicts between states and non-state 
actors. However, as the previous analysis has explicated, notions of the just war tradition 
are significantly present within the drone discourse of the Obama Administration. Thus, 
the Obama Administration maintains that conventional legal principles and core 
principles of the just war tradition continue to be applicable guidelines in the 
‘unconventional’ war against al Qaeda (Johnson, 2012; Holder, 2012). Jeh Johnson 
exemplifies this by stating: 
 
”In the conflict against an unconventional enemy such as al Qaeda, we must consistently 
apply conventional legal principles. We must apply, and have applied, the law of armed 
conflict, including applicable provisions of the Geneva Conventions and customary 
international law, core principles of distinction and proportionality, historic precedent, and 
traditional principles of statutory construction.“ 
                (Johnson, 2012) 
 
This same line of reasoning is also apparent within the speech of Attorney General 
Holder, who maintains that nothing “is changed by the fact that we are not in a 
conventional war” (Holder, 2012); the U.S. is still “authorized to take action against 
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enemy belligerents” who pose an “imminent threat of violent attack.” (ibid.). Thus, the 
Obama Administration seems to recognize the current conflict as something new and 
unconventional; yet continue to draw on the discursive framework of a tradition that was 
originally conceived within a different conflict setting of interstate engagements. 
Arguably, the Obama Administration hereby recontextualizes the just war tradition, 
which according to Fairclough involves a “movement of a discourse from one context 
(one network of practices, one institution, one field and so forth) to another” 
(Fairclough, 2010:500).  
 
Thus, it is possible to speak of a recontextualization insofar as the just war tradition is 
being used to address a new set of practices. This assessment of whether or not the 
patterns of contemporary conflicts signify ’new’ practices of warfare lies beyond the 
scope of this project. However, it is an issue that has been undertaken by IR scholars 
such as Mary Kaldor (2013) and Derek Gregory (2011), who converge around the idea 
that contemporary practice of war can no longer be understood strictly in Clausewitzean 
terms; the argument is, among other things, that the distinction between military and 
civilian targets has become blurred and “military violence is loosened from its frames, 
the conventional ties between war and geography have come undone” (Gregory, 
2011:239). On this ground, it is possible to argue that the drone discourse of the Obama 
Administration signifies a recontextualization of the just war tradition in the sense that 
the tradition is used in relation to a new set of social practices, i.e. the proclaimed 
‘unconventional’ trans-boundary conflict against Al Qaeda in which drone use is a key 
strategy. 
 
According to Fairclough, recontextualization does not only entail reproduction of a 
distinct discourse within a new context; it may also transform its ideational meaning 
through creative articulations (Fairclough, 2010:500). This thesis seems to find support 
in a statement by John Brennan, in which he states that the new sort of threat posed by 
terrorist organizations calls for a revision of the traditional notion of ‘imminence’. 
Brennan advocates that: 
 
“the traditional conception of what constitutes an imminent attack should be broadened in 
the light of modern day capabilities, techniques, and technological innovations of terrorist 
organizations.”                          (Brennan, 2011) 
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In this specific context, the recontextualization of the just war tradition involves creative 
articulation, which ascribes new meaning to the concept of imminence. In other words, 
the statement explicitly seeks to reconceptualize a dimension of the just war tradition. 
Brennan’s statement draws clear intertextual parallels to the former National Security 
Strategy of President Bush (2002), in which it was maintained that “we must adapt the 
concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries.” 
(NSS, 2002). Brennan’s statement hereby champions a view on self-defense and 
preemption similar to that of the former administration.  
 
In conclusion, it is important to emphasize that Brennan’s statement stands out as a 
singularity within the speeches. As the previous analytical sections demonstrated, the 
Obama Administration is predominantly occupied with framing the terrorist threat posed 
by Al Qaeda as imminent without explicitly trying to broaden the concept. Hence, the 
speeches do not seek to reconceptualize the different principles of the just war tradition. 
Instead, the Obama Administration merely champions that the principles are directly 
applicable to the current conflict and U.S. drone use, despite the fact that the notions of 
just warfare were conceived within a different conflict setting.  
 
In doing so, the drone discourse of the Obama Administration does not only reproduce 
the notions of the just war tradition when legitimizing the U.S. drone program; they 
recontextualize the tradition by applying the conventional framework of just warfare to a 
proclaimed ‘new’ and ‘unconventional’ conflict setting, thus ascribing novel meanings 
to the tradition. 
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This study has sought to unsettle the prevailing perceptions of drone use apparent within 
the foreign policy discourses of the Obama Administration. The argument that this study 
initially sets forth is that the discursively mediated ideas related to drone use matter; 
they ascribe distinctive meanings to drones, to drone use, and to the legitimacy of the 
U.S. drone program. Thus, the core ambition of this study has been to examine to what 
extent the Obama Administration justifies U.S. drone use through the concepts of the 
just war tradition; and how this discursive framing constructs a distinct ideational system 
of knowledge and belief related to the U.S. drone program. 
 
By carrying out a discourse analysis of key speeches and The White Paper, this study 
argues that the principles of the just war tradition are highly present within the Obama 
Administration’s framing of the U.S. drone program. The Obama Administration 
incorporates core elements of the just war tradition, drawing on principles of both jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello to a high extent thereby legitimizing U.S. use of drones. In this 
respect, the principles of the just war tradition are essential components in constructing a 
threat, in justifying a response!to this threat and the specific manner in which a response 
is formulated, i.e. how drones are being framed as the answer to this threat. 
  
Thus, all principles of the just war tradition are highly apparent within the speeches of 
the Obama Administration. The discursive framing of an ‘imminent’ and ‘continuous’ 
threat contributes to the construction of a just cause for U.S. foreign engagement with Al 
Qaeda. Moreover, the wording of Al Qaeda as a malicious entity strengthens the notion 
that action is correspondingly rightfully intended. The construction of a ‘murderous’ 
identity of the Al Qaeda on the one hand, and the ‘rightfully intended’ U.S. ‘Self’ on the 
other provides justification for the use of armed force and targeted strikes against Al 
Qaeda. The threat posed by Al Qaeda is furthermore being presented as one that 
demands particular measures. In this context, drones are framed as the ideal military 
capability for counteracting the spatially distorted threat of the Al Qaeda network. From 
this discursive outlook, drones offer an unprecedented ability to act both proportionately 
and with great discrimination against targets of military value. Generally, the Obama 
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Administration presents these accounts of the U.S. drone program with a very high 
degree of modality, thus articulating them as factual assertions. In doing so, the drone 
discourse of the Obama Administration can be said to champion a distinct ideational 
system of knowledge, in which it is an indisputable fact that drones are both rightful and 
appropriate.  
 
Furthermore, the principles of last resort, reasonable chance of success, and legitimate 
authority are integrated parts of the Obama Administration’s defense of U.S. drone use. 
The Obama Administration champions that drone strikes are carried out in accordance 
with the principle of last resort, claiming that the U.S. only intervene in countries with 
whom they are not officially at war with if the host country is unable or unwilling to act 
itself. The administration maintains that the war on Al Qaeda can be won, hereby 
propagating their belief in a reasonable chance of success. In this context, drones are 
being framed as a highly qualified instrument in achieving this success. The principle of 
legitimate authority is being put into play by the Obama Administration when 
continuously underlining the legitimate authority of the U.S. President to wage war 
against adversaries who pose a threat to!the American people. Finally, the sole mentions 
of ‘targeted strikes’, and thus the absence of addressing ‘signature strikes’, enhances the 
Administration’s claim of adhering to the principle of military necessity. According to 
the Administration, the conduct of targeted strikes involves careful assessments of 
military value. Combined with the framing of drones as being inherently discriminate 
and precise, drone strikes are constructed as being both prudent and accurate.  
 
In sum, this study finds support for the thesis that the Obama Administration justifies its 
use of drones through an ideational framework of warfare rooted in the just war 
tradition. The foreign policy discourse of the Obama Administration hereby incorporates!
principles of both jus ad bellum and jus in bello to a high extent in order to legitimize 
the use of drones. In doing so, the Obama Administration does not only reproduce the 
notions of the just war principles; they recontextualize the tradition by applying the 
conventional framework of just warfare to a proclaimed ‘new’ and ‘unconventional’ 
conflict setting, arguably ascribing novel meanings to the tradition. 
 !
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This section offer some reflections on the study’s overall constribution to the current IR 
drone debate. Moreover, it suggests further points of analysis. It is argued that this study 
presents a significant contribution to the topic of American drone use, while 
acknowledging that additional analysis may offer a more extensive understanding. The 
following raises a few points for complimentary analysis.  
 
This study has contributed with an examination of to what extent the Obama 
Administration constructs a certain system of knowledge and belief about the use of 
drones, by incorporating principles of the just war tradition. By drawing on elements of 
the just war tradition, the use of drones is being framed as legitimate and just. In doing 
so, the just war tradition, formulated in context of state-to-state conflicts, is being 
recontextualized. It has been outside of the intent of this study to discuss the altered 
character of the modern conflict between the United States and Al Qaeda from that of 
previous conflicts. Yet, both the character of the conflict and the manner in which it is 
conducted arguably differs from many previous encounters. Mary Kaldor (2005) 
outlines and discusses the implications of this alteration. Kaldor argues that security 
conceptions drawn from the dominant experiences of WWII and the Cold War refrains 
us from adequately understanding modern day insecurities (Kaldor, 2005). Kaldor 
outlines her main argument this way: “I would argue that both the ‘Cold War’ and the 
‘War on Terror’ resemble what I call ‘Old Wars’ using new technology.” (ibid.). This 
study has demonstrated how contemporary rhetoric incorporates traditional principles in 
order to legitimize what may, in line with Kaldor’s argument, not be fit for such contexts 
and thus entail particular implications. An analysis of such would require a broadening 
of the epistemological framework as to examine the relation between the discursive 
dimension and the social practices of modern conflicts.  
 
Additionally, this study has scrutinized articulations of the Obama Administration. 
Obviously, this is only one dimension of the discursive field concerning drone use. 
Hence, a more comprehensive analysis of the ideational conceptions related to drone use 
should entail other discursive positions. The Obama Administration constructs a 
perception of American drone use as complying with all international legal principles. 
UN Special Rapporteur Ben Emmerson is a prominent critic of this point, as stated in 
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field of interest section 1.1. Emmerson adds to this: “despite the proliferation of this 
technology, there remains a lack of consensus among international lawyers and between 
states on the core legal principles.” (Emmerson, 2013, cited in Pilkington & Devereaux, 
2013). An incorporation of differing discourses is feasible within the methodological 
approach of this study, but has not been possible within the specific temporal and spatial 
limitations. Incorporating such would not only inaugurate the topic at hand by allowing 
for an assessment of different constructs of systems of belief, but additionally allow for 
an evaluation of the most dominant discourse.  
 
This study briefly touches on the different concepts of pre-emptive and preventive force 
and on the characterization of imminence. In section 2.1, it is briefly highlighted how 
these conceptualizations have had different historical framings and conceptions. This 
study has argued that the construct of an ‘imminent’ threat is an essential component in 
the evaluation of appropriate force. A genealogic analysis of such conceptualizations 
could potentially illustrate how framing these concepts are essential in justifying certain 
behavior. Fisk & Ramos (2013) investigate the degree to which an international norm 
toward preventive self-defense is cascading in the international system, arguing that the 
cascade of a preventive self-defense norm correlates with the acquisition of drone 
technology (Fisk & Ramos, 2013:1). In the body of texts of the present discourse 
analysis, it is argued that drones respond to a threat as to avert an imminent danger, 
which traditionally is linked to the use of pre-emptive force. A scrutiny of these 
conceptualizations is not within the scope of this study to undertake. Nevertheless, it is 
delineated how the framing of these concepts matters and could make an interesting 
point for profound supplementary analysis.  
 
This study has conducted an exhaustive investigation of the extent to which the Obama 
Administration frames drone use drawing on just war principles. It offers a significant 
contribution to the understanding of the social imaginary concerning U.S. drone use, 
although this is merely one dimension of a bigger debate. Thus, the study does not 
supply an all-encompassing account of American drone use. The above section has 
served to bring up potential points for further analysis. In doing so, it is highlighted how 
both a broader methodological picture, incorporation of other discourses and a 
genealogical analysis could provide a more elaborate account of American drone use.  
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